Al-Mustanjid

Biography

Reign

Al-Mustanjid was born in 1124. He was the son of caliph al-Muqtafi and his mother was an Umm walad named Thawus al-Rumi. His full name was Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Muqtafi and his Kunya was Abu al-Muzaffar. When Yusuf was a young prince his father became Caliph in 1136. His father ruled for almost twenty-four years until his death in 1160. When his father died, he ascended to the throne.

During his early reign, one of al-Muqtafi's wives, al-Mustanjid's stepmother, Umm Abu Ali. She was the mother of his son Abu Ali ibn al-Muqtafi. She wanted her own son to succeed and after her husband's death in 1160, She gained over many amirs to her side, and had their slave-girls armed with daggers to kill the new caliph. Al-Mustanjid discovered the plot and placed the rebel son and mother in prison.

He continued the policies of his father and he also confirmed Awn al-Din ibn Hubayra as his vizier. Awn al-Din had previously served as the vizier to his father. Awn al-Din's Tenure marked the final decline of the Seljuq influence in the Abbasid court (cf. Abbasid–Seljuk war), and saw a flowering of Hanbali learning in Baghdad. Ibn Hubayra was also involved in the conquest of Fatimid Egypt by Nur ad-Din Zangi.

During his reign, Al-Mustanjid called upon Ibn al-Jawzi to preach his sermons in the Caliph's palace mosque – one of the most prominent houses of worship in the whole of Baghdad – during the three campaigns of Nur al-Din Zengi against the tottering Fatimid regime. In these sermons, Ibn al-Jawzi is said to have "vigorously defended the prophetic precedent and criticized, not only all those whom he considered to be schismatics, but also the jurists who were too blindly attached to their own schools of law."

There is little else to say than that this caliph continued to occupy a more or less independent position, with a vizier and courtly surroundings, and supported by only a small force sufficient for an occasional local campaign.

Revival of Abbasid influence in Egypt

During Al-Mustanjid's reign the Caliphate saw a revival of Abbasid influence over Egypt, which was under rival Fatimids. General Shirkuh died from choking on his meal on 23 March 1169. His unexpected departure left a power vacuum, both in the Fatimid government as well as the Syrian expeditionary force. The Fatimid elites conferred in the caliphal palace. Some proposed that Saladin be appointed to the vizierate, while others, led by the eunuch majordomo Mu'tamin al-Khilafa Jawhar, suggested that the Syrians should be given military fiefs (iqta') in the Nile Delta, thus removing them from Cairo, and that no vizier should be appointed, with al-Adid resuming personal rule like his predecessors at the beginning of the dynasty. The Syrian commanders also vied among themselves for the leadership, until Saladin emerged as the favoured candidate. Then, on 26 March 1169, Saladin was received at the caliphal palace and appointed to the vizierate, with the title of al-Malik al-Nasir (lit. 'the King who Brings Victory'). The fiction that Saladin was al-Adid's servant was upheld, but the real balance of power is shown by the fact that in the document of investiture, for the first time, the vizierate was declared as hereditary.

Nevertheless, Saladin's position was far from secure. His forces numbered a few thousand and, even though superior in combat ability, were massively outnumbered by the Fatimid troops. Furthermore, Saladin could not fully rely on the loyalty of his own commanders. Saladin's role in the Fatimid state was also a source of contradictions: he was a Sunni, who had come into Egypt with a Sunni army, and who still owed allegiance to Nur al-Din's militantly Sunni regime; but as vizier of the Fatimid caliph, he was in charge of a nominally Isma'ili state, and even of the Isma'ili religious establishment (da'wa). The Fatimid elites in the court and the army were bound to oppose Saladin's attempts to dismantle the Egyptian regime, while Nur al-Din was distrustful of his erstwhile subordinate's intentions. This obliged Saladin to tread carefully at first, making a serious effort to establish good relations with al-Adid and promote a public image of harmony between the two. After additional Syrian troops arrived under the command of Saladin's older brother, Shams ad-Din Turanshah, Saladin gradually distanced himself from the Fatimid regime, starting by introducing Nur al-Din's name in the Friday sermon after that of al-Adid. Al-Adid was relegated to a ceremonial role, and even publicly humiliated when Saladin entered the palace on horseback (hitherto a privilege of the caliphs). Saladin also began openly favouring his Syrian troops, awarding them military fiefs for their upkeep, while withdrawing similar fiefs from the Fatimid commanders. Lev points out that a considerable part of the Fatimid civilian bureaucracy, many of them by now Sunnis, had become alienated from the regime they served. Many of them—most notably the chancery official Qadi al-Fadil—chose to collaborate with Saladin and effectively helped him undermine the Fatimid regime.