Second World War service
Coningham began the war as an air commodore commanding Bomber Command's 4 Group, which he led for two years including the first year of the bombing offensive against Germany. His group was small, seldom numbering more than 60 air crews total in the first part of the war, and unlike the rest of Bomber Command conducted its operations at night. Consequently, nearly all of the missions of its Whitley bombers before 19/20 March 1940 were for the delivery of propaganda leaflets over German territory against comparatively ineffective defences. During the remainder of 1940, 4 Group attacked targets in Italy until these were allotted to 3 Group in December, and targets in the Ruhr, all of small scale and causing little damage. Coningham in September received promotion to air vice-marshal. In November, area bombing began, again on a small scale, and continued throughout the winter. 4 Group was just beginning to expand and convert its equipment to Handley Page Halifax bombers when Coningham was transferred.
In July 1941 he was called to Egypt by Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, head of RAF Middle East Command, to take over 204 Group from Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw. Two months later, to match its growing size and its status with the newly formed Eighth Army, the group was transformed into the Western Desert Air Force. Coningham inherited a poorly functioning situation, where the RAF was almost totally failing to support ground troops. He promptly delegated out technical duties to those he trusted and did not micromanage them; however, he held his subordinates strictly responsible for achieving the results he wanted. Any mistakes by his underlings that resulted in fatalities to friendly troops were grounds for dismissal by Coningham.
Faced with equipment shortages, a hostile desert environment, and superior enemy planes, Coningham's management system, through judicious deployment of his squadrons, gradually achieved air superiority in the North African campaign. In particular, Coningham developed the use of fighter-bombers, able to fight as fighter planes in the air or in bombing and strafing attacks of enemy ground targets. Coningham developed an efficient ground support system to keep planes flying, and a command and control system to allow ground observers to radio in air attacks. Coningham's Western Desert Air Force, in continuous air attacks of enemy ground targets, was instrumental in stopping the enemy offensive at El Alamein in July 1942. Coningham formed a close relationship with the new Eighth Army commander, General Bernard Montgomery. Montgomery and Coningham recognised the importance of joint operations. The air power doctrine devised by Coningham is the basis of modern joint operations doctrine. The dominance of the Allied air force was a critical factor in the British victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942. Coningham's doctrine of tactical air power would reach its fruition in early 1943, when RAF and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) fighter-bombers and bombers attacked enemy land forces.
Coningham's doctrine was fundamental. He stated that the greatest attribute of air power was its ability to speedily concentrate its force. It followed that its command must also be concentrated. Tactical air power had to be closely coordinated with the ground forces, but the army could not command it. He stated as much in a pamphlet that was widely distributed, to every ranking officer in North Africa, so that they would know what to expect. The pamphlet included Coningham's priorities for success in use of tactical air power. First, gain air superiority. Second, use the air superiority gained to interdict enemy reinforcements of men and materiel to isolate the battlefield. Third, combine air attacks with ground assaults on the front lines.
Coningham was knighted after El Alamein and continued to provide tactical air support for the Eighth Army until they occupied Tripoli in January 1943. Later in 1943 Coningham was promoted to Air Marshal and directed tactical air force operations in the Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy as commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force.
As the leading exponent of tactical air warfare, Coningham was the obvious choice to command 2nd Tactical Air Force in the North-West European campaign under Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commanding the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, and in January 1944 he was recalled to Britain where he helped plan air support for the Normandy landings. His relationship with Montgomery deteriorated markedly after the landings took place. The two often clashed when Montgomery regularly tried to bypass Coningham, who was the designated point of contact for air support requests, and deal directly with Leigh-Mallory. At the end of June, Montgomery lobbied Tedder, now deputy commander to U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower at Supreme Allied Headquarters, for Coningham's removal after he criticised the army for tardiness in capturing Caen in order to make available airfields for tactical aircraft. Tedder, however, advised Eisenhower that such removal would be "a disaster" and the criticism valid. In August 1944 Montgomery wrote to Alan Brooke that "Coningham is violently anti-army and despised by all soldiers; my army commanders mistrust him and never want to see him." However it was Montgomery who received a rebuke from Eisenhower, while Leigh-Mallory's headquarters was dissolved in October as an unnecessary command echelon.
He remained commander of the 2nd Tactical Air Force until July 1945, when he was replaced by Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas and appointed head of Flying Training Command.
A keen yachtsman, in 1947 he was appointed Commodore of the RAF Yacht Club then based at Calshot; however he later oversaw the move to the current location at Hamble.
