empire

Definition

An empire is an aggregate of many territories under a supreme ruler or oligarchy. This is in contrast to a federation, which is an extensive state voluntarily composed of autonomous states and peoples. An empire is a large polity which rules over territories outside of its original borders.

Definitions of what physically and politically constitutes an empire vary. It might be a state affecting imperial policies or a particular political structure. Empires are typically formed from diverse ethnic, national, cultural, and religious components. 'Empire' and 'Colonialism' are used to refer to relationships between a powerful state or society versus a less powerful one; Michael W. Doyle has defined empire as "effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society". Imperialism for Doyle is simply the process of establishing and maintaining an empire. Similarly, for Rein Taagepera imperialism is a policy of conquest and domination of foreign lands and populations.

Initially, the Marxist conception of imperialism was New Imperialism, where the qualifier "new" differentiated the contemporary imperialism from earlier imperialism, such as the formation of ancient empires and the first wave of European colonization. Eventually, Lenin cancelled all earlier forms and began the history of Imperialism in the 1760s. The Leninist definition of imperialism removed the essence of empire from politics, focused more on economics and explicitly denied that modern capitalist imperialism had anything in common with the empires of the past.

Since the beginning, mainstream historians of empire were puzzled: as the highest stage of capitalism, imperialism cannot exist before 1876. Such a concept is not very helpful “if we do not know for certain whether it fits the facts of two millennia or… two generations.” Kenneth Waltz believed that the cause of imperialism was capitalism, but appears much younger than the effect (imperialism). He believed that it is as though Newton explained gravitation by a 17th-century phenomenon, ignoring that gravitation operated earlier. Lenin’s work was interpreted as political pamphlet rather than scientific thesis, suitable for "the half-educated whose power of criticism was not fully developed," and calling them to hunt the “invisible hand” of economic exploitation. According to Michael Doyle, thus imperialism turned into an economic and European phenomenon. The pamphlet re-defined empire as the original sin of European peoples, who corrupted an 'innocent world', and the belief became wholeheartedly shared all over the non-Western world. In this world, the word imperialist became "the 20th-century version of the devil" who has constant designs on their sovereignty and economic growth.

Characteristics

Many empires were the result of military conquest, incorporating the vanquished states into a political union, but imperial hegemony can be established in other ways. According to Edward Luttwak, there are two main ways to establish and maintain an imperial political structure: (i) as a territorial empire of direct conquest and control by force or (ii) as a coercive, hegemonic empire of indirect control. The former method provides greater tribute and direct political control, yet limits further expansion because it absorbs military forces to fixed garrisons. The latter method provides less tribute and indirect control, but avails military forces for further expansion.

Empires can expand by both land and sea. Territorial empires (e.g. the Macedonian Empire and Byzantine Empire) tend to be contiguous areas extending directly outwards from the original frontier. The terrestrial empire's maritime analogue is the thalassocracy, an empire composed of islands and coasts which are accessible to its terrestrial homeland, such as the Athenian-dominated Delian League and the British Empire) with looser structures and more scattered territories, often consisting of many islands and other forms of possessions which required the creation and maintenance of a powerful navy.

The Athenian Empire, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire developed at least in part under elective auspices. Empires such as the Holy Roman Empire also came together by electing the emperor with votes from member realms through the Imperial election. The Empire of Brazil declared itself an empire after separating from the Portuguese Empire in 1822. France has twice transitioned from being called the French Republic to being called the French Empire while it retained an overseas empire. Europeans began applying the designation of "empire" to non-European monarchies, such as the Qing Empire and the Mughal Empire, as well as the Maratha Confederacy, eventually leading to the looser denotations applicable to any political structure meeting their criteria of "imperium". Some monarchies styled themselves as having greater size, scope, and power than the territorial, politico-military, and economic facts support. As a consequence, some monarchs assumed the title of "emperor" (or its corresponding translation, tsar, empereur, kaiser, shah etc.) and renamed their states as "The Empire of ..."

Empires were seen as expanding power and administration, and guaranteeing stability, security and legal order for their subjects. They tried to minimize ethnic and religious antagonism inside the empire. Some empires tended to impose their ideas, beliefs and cultural habits on the subject states to strengthen the imperial structure; others opted for multicultural and cosmopolitan policies. Anthony Pagden estimates that most of the early empires were multicultural and attempted to incorporate various groups into some larger cosmopolitan whole. The aristocracies that ruled empires were often more cosmopolitan and broad-minded than their nationalistic successors. Cultures generated by empires could have notable effects that outlasted the empire itself.

History

Stephen Howe writes that with the exception of the Roman, Chinese and "perhaps ancient Egyptian states", early empires seldom survived the death of their founder and were usually limited in scope to conquest and collection of tribute, having little impact on the everyday lives of their subjects.

With the exception of Rome, the periods of dissolution following imperial falls were equally short. Successor states seldom outlived their founders and disappeared in the next and often larger empire. Only in the wreckage of the Roman Empire, distinguished Robert G. Wesson, a system of full-fledged nation-states evolved and it took a millennium. "It seems almost impossible for a community of free states to reemerge where a universal empire has once stretched across the land and fixed its ways and symbols of authority." Walter Scheidel also finds Europe exceptional among civilizations which experienced imperial unity because for an entire millennium (between Charlemagne and Napoleon) no single power managed to control more than one-fifth of the region’s population. Some empires, like the Neo-Babylonian, Median and Lydian were outright conquered by a larger empire. The historical pattern was not a simple rise-and-fall cycle; rather it was rise, fall, and greater rise, taking on an increasingly global scale. Raoul Naroll called it "expanding pulsation," Christopher Chase-Dunn "upward sweeps," and Ian Morris "exponential growth."

Empires were limited in scope to conquest, as Howe observed, but conquest is a considerable scope. Many fought to the death to avoid it or to be liberated from it. Imperial conquests and attempts of conquest significantly contributed to the list of wars by death toll. The imperial impact on subjects can be regarded as "little," but only on those subjects who survived the imperial conquest and rule. We cannot ask the inhabitants of Carthage and Masada, for example, whether empire had little impact on their lives. We seldom hear the voices of subject peoples because history is mostly written by winners, that is, by the great empires themselves. The imperial sources tend to ignore or reduce the resistance by subdued states. But two rich primary sources of the subject population are the Hebrew Prophetic books and the Sibylline Oracles. The hatred towards the ruling empires expressed in these sources makes impression of an impact more serious than estimated by Howe. A classical writer and adherent of empire, Orosius explicitly preferred to avoid the views of subject populations. And another classical Roman patriot, Lucan confessed that "words cannot express how bitterly we are hated" by subject peoples. More subject voices were revealed by Historian Timothy H. Parson in his research of seven empires from the perspective of their subjects.

Early empires

The earliest known empire appeared in southern Egypt sometime around 3200 BC. Southern Egypt was divided by three kingdoms each centered on a powerful city. Hierapolis conquered the other two cities over two centuries, and later grew into the country of Egypt. The Akkadian Empire, established by Sargon of Akkad (24th century BC), was an early all-Mesopotamian empire which spread into Anatolia, the Levant and Ancient Iran. This imperial achievement was repeated by Shamshi-Adad I of the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia and Hammurabi of Babylon in the 19th and 18th centuries BC. In the 15th century BC, the New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt, ruled by Thutmose III, was ancient Africa's major force upon incorporating Nubia and the ancient city-states of the Levant.

In the Amarna Period (15th-13th centuries BC), Egypt, the Middle Assyrian Empire, Hittite Empire, and those of the Mitanni and Elamites formed club of great powers. Egypt and the Hittites emerged as two dominant Empires of the club and in 1274 BC clashed in the Battle of Kadesh. The confrontation was not decisive and soon the Amarna international system was dissolved during the late Bronze Age collapse. All its empires declined. The first empire to recover from the collapse was the Neo-Assyrian Empire (916–612 BC). By 673 BC, Assyria conquered the entire Fertile Crescent including Cyprus and Egypt.

The Assyrian achievement, however, was short lived. In the 6th century BC, the Median Empire, Babylonians, Scythians, and Cimmerians allied and defeated the Assyrian Empire. The Assyrian capital, Nineveh, was razed by their combined armies in 612 BC. Never again a world leading empire would be centered in a great River Valley. The fall of Nineveh marks the end of the River Valleys age and the beginning of the Axial Age, when the center of power shifted away from the great River Valleys, and empires suddenly became significantly larger. The Median Empire became the first leading empire, the largest of its day, centered beyond River Valleys. This Empire lasted for about sixty years and was conquered by the Persian Empire.

From 1500 BC in China rose the Shang Empire which was succeeded by the Zhou Empire around 1100 BC. Chronologically, the collapse of Shang also coincides with the late Bronze Age collapse. Both Shang and Zhou equalled or surpassed in territory their contemporary Near Eastern empires. The Zhou Empire dissolved in 770 BC into feudal multi-state system which lasted for five and a half centuries until the universal conquest of Qin in 221 BC.

Classical period

The Axial Age (mid-First Millennium BC) witnessed unprecedented imperial expansion in the Indo-Mediterranean region and China, distinguished as the most "dramatic" surge in premodern history. The array of successive and parallel empires of the Age makes "bewildering" impression on imperiometric experts. The Axial threshold is remarkable in world history. From 600 BC, the area of the largest empire would never fell below 2.0 million km2 (0.77 million sq mi) – a size never reached before 600 BC. The Colonial surge was less exponential. The Axial surge culminated with the Roman, Kushan and Han Empires ruling over as many as two-thirds of all people on Earth, the most extreme ever degree of imperial consolidation. The relative demographic size of the three largest empires in the world was not as massive before and ever since.

The successful and extensive Achaemenid Empire (550–330 BC), also known as the first Persian Empire, covered Mesopotamia, Egypt, parts of Greece, Thrace, the Middle East, much of Central Asia, and North-Western India. It is considered the first great empire in history or the first "world empire". It was overthrown and replaced by the short-lived empire of Alexander the Great. His Empire was succeeded by three Empires ruled by the Diadochi—the Seleucid, Ptolemaic, and Antigonid, which, despite being independent, are called the "Hellenistic Empire" by virtue of their similarities in culture and administration.

Meanwhile, in the western Mediterranean the Empires of Carthage and Rome began their rise. Having decisively defeated Carthage in 202 BC, Rome defeated Macedonia in 200 BC and the Seleucids in 190–189 BC to establish an all-Mediterranean Empire. The Seleucid Empire broke apart and its former eastern part was absorbed by the Parthian Empire. In 30 BC Rome annexed Ptolemaic Egypt.

In India during the Axial Age appeared the Maurya Empire—a geographically extensive and powerful empire, ruled by the Mauryan dynasty from 321 to 185 BC. The empire was founded in 322 BC by Chandragupta Maurya through the help of Chanakya, who rapidly expanded his power westward across central and western India, taking advantage of the disruptions of local powers following the withdrawal by Alexander the Great. By 320 BC, the Maurya Empire had fully occupied northwestern India as well as defeating and conquering the satraps left by Alexander. Under Emperor Ashoka the Great, the Maurya Empire became the first Indian empire to conquer the whole Indian Peninsula — an achievement repeated only twice, by the Gupta and Mughal Empires. In the reign of Ashoka Buddhism spread to become the dominant religion in many parts of the ancient India.

Post-classical period

The fall of Rome looms large in the Eurocentric view of history but it did not alter the general imperial trend and the rest of Eurasia does not fit the "Middle Ages" of the Eurocentric periodization. Far from a graveyard of empires, the new age is marked by vibrant imperial formations continuing the earlier imperial impulse undimmed. Empires continued to establish new records, albeit with longer intervals, and some experienced Golden Ages. China reunified by the 6th century and under the Tang dynasty pushed into Central Asia. In the 8th century, the Caliphate became the largest so far empire in area. The Caliphate and China crossed the whole Old World from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In the 9th century, China under the Song dynasty established the all-time record in the share of world population (38%). And in the 13th century, the Mongols created the largest ever contigous empire. The two last records still hold.

In West Asia, the term "Persian Empire" came to denote the Iranian imperial states established in the pre–Islamic and, beginning with the Safavid Empire, modern Persia. In the 7th century, the Arab Empire was established by Muhammad, the founder of Islam. Over the next century, in one of the fastest and vastest expansions in history, his Empire conquered Persia and expanded on three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe). At their height, under the Umayyad Caliphate, the territory that was conquered by the Arab Empire stretched from Iberia (at the Pyrenees) in the west to India (at Sind) in the east. In 751 AD, the Arab and Chinese Empires clashed in the Battle of Talas.

In East Asia, various Chinese empires (or dynasties) dominated the political, economic and cultural landscapes during this era, the most powerful of which was probably the Tang Empire (618–690, 705–907). Other influential Chinese empires during the post-classical period include the Sui Empire (581–618), the Great Liao Empire, the Song Empire, the Western Xia Empire (1038–1227), the Great Jin Empire (1115–1234), the Western Liao Empire (1124–1218), the Great Yuan Empire (1271–1368), and the Great Ming Empire (1368–1644). During this period, Japan and Korea underwent voluntary Sinicization. The Sui, Tang and Song empires had the world's largest economy and were the most technologically advanced during their time. The Song population reached 125 million in 1125, representing 38% of a world population – the largest percentage any empire has ever reached. The Great Yuan Empire was the world's ninth largest empire by total land area; while the Great Ming Empire is famous for the seven maritime expeditions led by Zheng He.

Early Modern period

In 1547, Ivan the Terrible was crowned Emperor of Russia. He transformed Russia from a medieval state to a fledgling empire and began the conquest of Siberia. With this conquest completed by 1778, the Russian Empire became the second contiguous empire in size after the Mongol Empire.

The Islamic gunpowder empires started to develop from the 15th century. In the Indian subcontinent, the Delhi Sultanate conquered most of the Indian peninsula and spread Islam across it. It later disintegrated with the establishment of the Bengal, Gujarat, and Bahmani Sultanate. In the 16th century, the Mughal Empire was founded by Timur and Genghis Khan's direct descendant Babur. His successors such Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan extended the empire. In the 17th century, Aurangzeb expanded the Mughal Empire over most of the South Asia and imposed Sharia. The Mughal Empire became the world's largest economy and leading manufacturing power with a nominal GDP that valued a quarter of world GDP, superior than the combination of Europe's GDP. It has been estimated that the Mughal emperors controlled an unprecedented one-fourth of the world's entire economy and was home to one-fourth of the world's population at the time. After the death of Aurangzeb, which marks the end of the medieval India and the beginning of European invasion in India, the empire was weakened by Nader Shah's invasion. The Mysore Empire was established by Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, who allied with Napoleon Bonaparte. Other independent empires were also established, such as those ruled by the Nawabs of Bengal and Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Great Qing Empire of China (1644–1912) was the fourth largest empire in world history by total land area, and laid the foundation for the modern territorial claims of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Apart from having direct control over much of East Asia, the empire also exerted domination over other states through the Chinese tributary system. The multiethnic and multicultural nature of the Great Qing Empire was crucial to the subsequent birth of the nationalistic concept of zhonghua minzu. The empire reached its peak during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, after which the empire entered a period of prolonged decline, culminating in its collapse as a result of the Xinhai Revolution.

The Ashanti Empire (or Confederacy), also Asanteman (1701–1896), was a West African state of the Ashanti, the Akan people of the Ashanti Region, Akanland in modern-day Ghana. The Ashanti (or Asante) were a powerful, militaristic and highly disciplined people in West Africa. Their military power, which came from effective strategy and an early adoption of European firearms, created an empire that stretched from central Akanland (in modern-day Ghana) to present day Benin and Ivory Coast, bordered by the Dagomba kingdom to the north and Dahomey to the east. Due to the empire's military prowess, sophisticated hierarchy, social stratification and culture, the Ashanti empire had one of the largest historiographies of any indigenous Sub-Saharan African political entity.

Colonial empires

Beginning in the 15th century, a number of west European countries reached and colonized overseas regions across the globe. Ushering the Age of Discovery, the imperial expansion advanced to a new global scale. The extensive overseas expansion, particularly in the South Asia and Americas by the Portuguese and Spanish, later joined by the English, French and Dutch, created empires on which the Sun never sets. The global scale is one of main distinctions between the colonial and traditional land empires. Colonial empires were a transformative period in world history when previously isolated parts of the world became connected to form one world system. They laid the groundwork for globalization, and set human history on the global common course. For this reason, Adam Smith in 1776 named the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama "the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind."

The Portuguese Empire colonized vast portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania to become one of the most powerful empires of the period, the longest-lived colonial empire in European history, and one of the largest empires in history. The Spanish Empire expanded over the same continents as well as in Europe, exceeding the Portuguese rival in size and, among colonial empires, remaining second only to Britain.

The British Empire established an absolute imperial record in size and, for a century, was the foremost global power. The British established their first empire (1583–1783) in North America by colonising lands that made up British America, including parts of Canada, the Caribbean and the Thirteen Colonies. In 1776, the Continental Congress of the Thirteen Colonies declared itself independent from the British Empire, thus beginning the American Revolution. Britain turned towards Asia, the Pacific, and later Africa, with subsequent exploration and conquests leading to the rise of the Second British Empire (1783–1815), which was followed by the Industrial Revolution and Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914). It became the largest empire in world history, encompassing one quarter of the world's land area and one fifth of its population. The impacts of this period are still prominent in the current age "including widespread use of the English language, belief in Protestant religion, economic globalization, modern precepts of law and order, and representative democracy."

In India, Britain confronted the Sikh Empire (1799–1849) in the Punjab region. Weakened by the death of its founder, Ranjit Singh, in 1839, the empire fell to the British after the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849. During the same period, the Maratha Empire (also known as the Maratha Confederacy) was a Hindu state located in present-day India. It existed from 1674 to 1818, and at its peak, the empire's territories covered much of Southern Asia. The empire was founded and consolidated by Shivaji. After the death of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, it expanded greatly under the rule of the Peshwas. In 1761, the Maratha army lost the Third Battle of Panipat, which halted the expansion of the empire. Later, the empire was divided into a confederacy of states which, in 1818, were lost to the British during the Anglo-Maratha wars.

Late modern period

Beginning around 1760, the New Imperialism or Age of Imperialism characterizes a period of colonial expansion by European powers, the United States and Japan. Though the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) and the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America in the 1820s ended the first era of European colonialism, the period featured an unprecedented pursuit of overseas territorial acquisitions. At the time, states focused on building their empires with new technological advances and developments. During the era of New Imperialism, the European powers and Japan conquered almost all of Africa and most of Asia. The new wave of imperialism reflected ongoing imperial rivalries, their imperial ambitions, and a "civilizing mission".

With the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the Austrian Empire (1804–1867) emerged reconstituted as the Empire of Austria-Hungary (1867–1918) and claimed to "inherite" the imperium of Central and Western Europe. Another "heir to the Holy Roman Empire", was the German Empire (1871–1918).

Over the course of the Scramble for Africa (1870-1914), European empires separated between themselves almost all the continent. Symbolized by the Pink Map, the Portuguese claimed sovereignty over a wide land corridor stretching between the Atlantic shore of Angola and Indian shore of Mozambique. This led to the 1890 British Ultimatum as Britain aimed to establish their own and longer corridor from Egypt to South Africa. In the clash of the corridors, the British prevailed.

The Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 signaled the advent of new extra-European empires, the United States and Japan respectively. The two events marked the closure of the "imperial belt"—belt of great empires stretching from west to east. Originally formed in the Old World during the Axial Age along the Silk Road, this belt shifted northward during the medieval period due to climatic change, penetrated to North America in the colonial period, and "closed" in the Far East c.1900. The history of empires ceased being eurocentric. The attack on Pearl Harbor symbolized the fact that two non-European empires clashed on the opposite side of the globe to Europe.

Though seldom viewed through an imperial lens, the World Wars were imperial wars. All great powers which waged both World Wars were empires fighting for their survival or expansion. The alliances and rivalries that brought about World War I were inter-imperial. The empires that came to an end after this War did not die a natural death as an intrinsically anachronistic organizations; their demise was the consequence of the "clash of empires" in which stronger empires won, added colonies and introduced "mandate." No victorious empire dissolved. Colonial expansion reached its zenith during the interwar period, when, including the sphere under the Monroe Doctrine, 85% of the earth dry land came under an imperial system. Imperial continuity, transformation and invention characterize the two decades after the enunciation of the doctrine of self-determination. The world order of this time remained an imperial one. In his magnum opus Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann titled the chapter on World War II "The last interimperial war," where he concluded that European and Japanese imperialism was the deeper cause of the War. On January 18, 1942, the Axis powers agreed to divide up Eurasia along the 70th meridian east envisioning "two large imperial blocs." The Axis lost and instead of the 70 meridian the frontier between the two remaining imperial blocs was fixed on the Fulda Gap.

Fall of empires

The fall of an empire is typically associated with a change in the regional or world order, with a new hegemon replacing the former empire. There is typically a decline in soft power and hard power. During the fall, the empire typically retreats its expanded operations. Trade shrinks as the former empire shifts its priorities towards domestic policy. Living conditions may deteriorate as the economy shrinks. Balkanization or territorial divisions may occur. However, this process is not universal. Some empires are more resilient and fall gradually while others experience complete chaos.

Roman Empire

The fall of the western half of the Roman Empire is seen as one of the most pivotal points in all of human history. This event traditionally marks the transition from classical civilization to the birth of Europe. The Roman Empire started to decline at the end of the reign of the last of the Five Good Emperors, Marcus Aurelius in 161–180 A.D. There is still a debate over the cause of the fall of one of the largest empires in history. Historian André Piganiol argues that the Roman Empire under its authority can be described as "a period of terror", holding its imperial system accountable for its failure. Another theory blames the rise of Christianity as the cause, arguing that the spread of certain Christian ideals caused internal weakness of the military and state. In his book The Fall of the Roman Empire, historian Peter Heather contends that there were many factors, including issues of money and manpower, which produced military limitations and culminated in the Roman army's inability to effectively repel invading barbarians at the frontier. The Western Roman economy was already stretched to its limit in the 4th and 5th centuries C.E. due to continual conflict and loss of territory which, in turn, generated loss of revenue from the tax base. There was also the looming presence of the Persians which, at any time, took a large percentage of the fighting force's attention. At the same time the Huns, a nomadic warrior people from the steppes of Asia, are also putting extreme pressure on the German tribes outside of the Roman frontier, which gave the German tribes no other choice, geographically, but to move into Roman territory. At this point, without increased funding, the Roman army could no longer effectively defend its borders against major waves of Germanic tribes. This inability is illustrated by the crushing defeat at Adrianople in 378 C.E. and, later, the Crossing of the Rhine in 406 C.E.

An empire can fall for many reasons. However, why the fall of the Roman Empire was fatal, and why the post-classical Europe never repeated its ancient unity, is a completely different question. Eurocentrism in the Roman case led to the theory of inevitable imperial fall and Western declinism in imperiology, which remains the only widely believed case of historical inevitability. To describe any polity as an empire is usually to damn it as doomed to disappear, usually due to imperial overstretch. Comparative history, however, alters the Eurocentric theory. The Chinese Empire rose synchronously with Rome and never fell. More precisely, China underwent several disintegrations but each time reunified and each time faster. Asking why post-Roman Europe, contrary to China, never reunified reveals factors which the case study of the fall of Rome cannot reveal. The latter question was addressed in this comparative analysis.

Decolonization

After 1945, the Empire of Japan retained its Emperor but lost its colonial possessions and became the State of Japan. Despite the semantic reference to imperial power, Japan is a de jure constitutional monarchy, with a homogeneous population of 127 million people that is 98.5 percent ethnic Japanese, making it one of the largest nation-states. The deconstruction of European colonial empires also quickened and became commonly known as decolonisation. The British Empire evolved into a loose, multinational Commonwealth of Nations, while the French colonial empire metamorphosed to a Francophone commonwealth. The same process happened to the Portuguese Empire, which evolved into a Lusophone commonwealth, and to the former territories of the extinct Spanish Empire, which alongside the Lusophone countries of Portugal and Brazil, created an Ibero-American commonwealth. France returned the French territory of Kwang-Chou-Wan to China in 1946. The British gave Hong Kong back to China in 1997 after 150 years of rule. The Portuguese territory of Macau reverted to China in 1999. Macau and Hong Kong did not become part of the provincial structure of China; they have autonomous systems of government as Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China.

France still governs overseas territories (French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Martin, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Guadeloupe, French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), Wallis and Futuna, Saint Barthélemy, and Mayotte), and exerts hegemony in Francafrique ("French Africa"; 29 francophone countries such as Chad, Rwanda, etc.). Fourteen British Overseas Territories remain under British sovereignty. Fifteen countries of the Commonwealth of Nations share their head of state, King Charles III, as Commonwealth realms.

Transition from empire

In time, an empire may change from one political entity to another. For example, the Holy Roman Empire, a German re-constitution of the Roman Empire, metamorphosed into various political structures (i.e., federalism), and eventually, under Habsburg rule, re-constituted itself in 1804 as the Austrian Empire, an empire much different politics and scope, which in turn became the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. The Roman Empire, perennially reborn, also lived on as the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire) – temporarily splitting into the Latin Empire, the Empire of Nicaea, and the Empire of Trebizond before its remaining territory and centre became part of the Ottoman Empire. A similarly persistent concept of empire saw the Mongol Empire become the Khanate of the Golden Horde, the Yuan Empire of China, and the Ilkhanate before resurrection as the Timurid Empire and as the Mughal Empire.

An autocratic empire can become a republic with its imperial dominions reduced to a core territory (e.g., Weimar Germany shorn of the German colonial empire in 1918–1919, the Ottoman Empire in 1918–1923, the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1918, or the Russian Empire after 1918 and again in 1989–1991). Or it can become a republic within the same borders (e.g., the Central African Empire in 1979).

Alternatively, an empire can integrate the ruling metropole with the ruled periphery to become state. Originally imperial cores, Wessex, the Capetian Île-de-France, Aragon and Castile, Sardinia, Prussia, and Muscovy merged with their imperial peripheries to form the states of England, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia respectively. Many "nation-states" of today, including "the most talked-about model of the nation-state" (France), were originally formed as empires. "The later ideology of nationalism of course disguises this unpalatable fact, just as it exhibits amnesia about many other aspects of the violent origins of nations."

Earlier, Narmer, Yamato, and Qin established empires which evolved into states of Egypt, Japan, and China. These states count millennia. Sociologists of empires, noted Krishan Kumar, have tended to ignore China because it does not fit neatly into their concept of imperial duration and ethnic composition. "If there is a successful imposition of the dominant system, the resultant elimination of differences produces a unified 'national' state rather than empire." All empires were temporary organizations but not all empires fell. The paradigm "all empires fall" is politically correct and historically wrong. However, according to Robert Conquest, deep historical analysis in the case is overshadowed by the popular wish of the US decline. Breaking the law of imperial fall means giving the United States a chance.

Contemporary usage

In "Prolegomena" to the 2021 two-volumes Oxford World History of Empire, editor Peter Fibiger Bang stated that humanity has moved beyond the postcolonial moment and imperialism has resurfaced as a global force. Although anti-imperialist in rhetoric, the leading military powers of today—the United States, China, and Russia—pursue imperial policies. In the "Epilogue" of this compilation Frederick Cooper added that the United States developed and maintains a form of imperial reach, now in competition with another imperial power of China, while the Russian Empire has reappeared in yet another transmutation on its Eurasian space. One year after the volumes went into press, Russia boldly confirmed these statements for itself. Having listed the United States, China, Russia, Israel, and ISIS as his examples of the contemporary imperial phenomena, John M. MacKenzie concludes: "What is incontrovertible is that empires are vital to an understanding not only of human history, but also of the world we live in now." Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan claim a significant imperial dimension in the contemporary political landscape and challenge the common assumption that nation states have displaced empires. Despite the official definition of empire as illegitimate, Cooper draws his conclusion, it is premature to tell whether we have mastered the skills of turning empire into new forms of political organization. Krishan Kumar explained what in his view means the end of empire. What disappeared in the 20th century is the name "empire," no state calls itself "empire." Meanwhile the phenomenon of empire continues under other names and produces a world significantly different from a theoretical world of equal states. Paraphrasing Mark Twain and William Faulkner, he suggested that rumours of empires' death are greatly exaggerated and their "past is never dead; it is not even past."

United States

Contemporaneously, the concept of empire is politically valid, yet is not always used in the traditional sense. One of the most widely discussed cases is the United States. Characterizing aspects of the US in regards to its territorial expansion, foreign policy, and its international behavior as "American Empire" is common. The term "American Empire" refers to the United States' cultural ideologies and foreign policy strategies. The term is most commonly used to describe the U.S.'s status since the 20th century, but it can also be applied to the United States' world standing before the rise of nationalism in the 20th century. The US itself was at one point a colony in the British Empire. Thomas Jefferson used the term "Empire of Liberty" and argued that "no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self government". Jefferson in the 1780s while awaiting the fall of the Spanish empire, said: "till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece".

Even so, the ideology that the US was founded on anti-imperialist principles has prevented many from acknowledging America's status as an empire. This active rejection of imperialist status is not limited to high-ranking government officials, as it has been ingrained in American society throughout its entire history. As David Ludden explains, "journalists, scholars, teachers, students, analysts, and politicians prefer to depict the U.S. as a nation pursuing its own interests and ideals". This often results in imperialist endeavors being presented as measures taken to enhance state security. Ludden explains this phenomenon with the concept of "ideological blinders", which he says prevent American citizens from realizing the true nature of America's current systems and strategies. These "ideological blinders" that people wear have resulted in an "invisible" American empire of which most American citizens are unaware. Besides its anti-imperialist principles, the United States is not traditionally recognized as an empire, because the U.S. adopted a different political system from those that previous empires had used.

Despite the anti-imperial ideology and systematic differences, the political objectives and strategies of the United States government have been quite similar to those of previous empires and so similar to Rome that the comparison between the two turned into cliché. In fact, the "unipolar moment" was followed by a so-called "imperial turn" in the academic research meaning increased interest in the study of empires. During the war on terror, the number of publications related to empire has increased exponentially, with reviewers complaining that they cannot keep the pace. In 2005, two notable Journals, History and Theory and Daedalus, devoted a special issue to empires. Reflecting the popularity of the theme, Sinologist Yuri Pines coined the term "comparative imperiology."

European Union

Since the European Union was formed as a polity in 1993, it has established its own currency, its own citizenship, established discrete military forces, and exercises its limited hegemony in the Mediterranean, eastern parts of Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. The big size and high development index of the EU economy often has the ability to influence global trade regulations in its favor. The political scientist Jan Zielonka suggests that this behavior is imperial because it coerces its neighbouring countries into adopting its European economic, legal, and political structures. Tony Benn, a left-wing Labour Party MP of the United Kingdom, opposed the European integration policies of the European Union by saying, "I think they're (the European Union) building an empire there, they want us (the United Kingdom) to be a part of their empire and I don't want that."

Russia

In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, political scientist Agnia Grigas argued that Moscow pursues the policy of "reimperialization." Two days after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a historian specializing on empires, Niall Ferguson, interpreted the policy of Putin as an attempt to bring back the tsarist Russian Empire. By this time, the "neo-imperialism," or "neo-imperial ambitions" of Russia became widely claimed. When Vladimir Putin denies the reality of the Ukrainian state, argues another historian of empires Timothy Snyder, he is speaking the familiar language of empire. For five hundred years, European conquerors saw themselves as actors with purpose, and the colonized as instruments to realize the imperial vision.

Vladimir Putin himself used to state: "For Russia to survive, it must remain an empire." In June 2022, on the 350 anniversary of the birth of the 18th-century Russian tsar Peter the Great, Putin has compared himself to him associating their twin historic quests to win back Russian lands. For critics this association implied that Putin's "complaints about historical injustice, eastward NATO expansion, and other grievances with the west were all a façade for a traditional war of conquest" and imperialism. "After months of denials that Russia is driven by imperial ambitions in Ukraine, Putin appeared to embrace that mission." On the same occasion, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the Ukrainian government, suggested Russia's "de-imperialization," instead of Russia's official war aim of "de-Nazification" of Ukraine.

Later that year, Anne Applebaum approached the new Russian Empire as a fact and opined that this Empire must be defeated. Other pundits described the new Russian Empire as a failed attempt because Russia failed to annex the whole of Ukraine.

Timeline of empires

The chart below shows a timeline of polities that have been called empires. Dynastic changes are marked with a white line.

The Roman Empire's timeline listed below includes the Western and Eastern portion.

The Empires of Nicaea and Trebizond were Byzantine successor states.

The Empire of Bronze Age Egypt is not included in the graph. Established by Narmer circa 3000 BC, it lasted as long as China until it was conquered by Achaemenid Persia in 525 BC.

Japan is presented for the period of its overseas Empire (1895–1945). The original Japanese Empire of "the Eight Islands" would be third persistent after Egypt and China.

Many Indian empires are also included, though only Mauryans, Guptas, Delhi Sultans, Mughals, Chola Empire and Marathas ruled for large periods in India.

Theoretical research

Empire versus nation state

Empires can be traced as far back as the recorded history goes and have been the dominant international organization in world history until the 20th century to the least. Yet a century ago, most of the world was ruled by persons who proudly proclaimed themselves Emperors and were proud of their Empires. Of the great powers, only the United States and France were republics. In his textbook on empires, Michael Doyle observed:

Empires have been the key actors in world politics for millennia. They helped create the interdependent civilizations of all the continents ... Imperial control stretches through history, many say, to the present day. Empires are as old as history itself ... They have held the leading role ever since.

Many empires endured for centuries, while the age of the ancient Egyptian, Chinese and Japanese Empires is counted in millennia. Most people throughout history have lived under imperial rule. Despite "efforts in words and wars to put national unity at the center of political imagination, imperial politics, imperial practices, and imperial cultures have shaped the world we live in."

Looking at a time frame of several millennia prior to the emergence of a global system, Robert Gilpin, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry observed that all pre-modern regional systems were initially anarchic and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into universal empires. For millennia, this propensity was the principal feature of pre-modern politics. pointing to a fundamental political dynamic.

This dynamic, according to Niall Ferguson, Ikenberry and Deudney, is obscured by our fixation on the Westphalian state. Within the macrohistoric trend, however, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy. By comparisons of Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper and Ferguson, nation-state appears as a "historical novelty" or a "blip on the historical horizon," that "emerged recently from under imperial skies" and whose hold may well prove "ephemeral." Moreover, the consolidations of European states proceeded synchronously with their imperial expansions worldwide. "Ironically, it was the European empires that carried the idea of the sovereign territorial state to the rest of the world..."

Universal empire

Expert on warfare Quincy Wright generalized on what he called "universal empire"—empire unifying all the contemporary system:

Balance of power systems have in the past tended, through the process of conquest of lesser states by greater states, towards reduction in the number of states involved, and towards less frequent but more devastating wars, until eventually a universal empire has been established through the conquest by one of all those remaining.

German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck finds that the macro-historic process of imperial expansion gave rise to global history in which the formations of universal empires were most significant stages. A later group of political scientists, working on the phenomenon of the current unipolarity, in 2007 edited research on several pre-modern civilizations by experts in respective fields. The overall conclusion was that the balance of power was inherently unstable order and usually soon broke in favor of imperial order. Yet before the advent of the unipolarity, world historian Arnold Toynbee and political scientist Martin Wight had drawn the same conclusion with an unambiguous implication for the modern world:

When this [imperial] pattern of political history is found in the New World as well as in the Old World, it looks as if the pattern must be intrinsic to the political history of societies of the species we call civilizations, in whatever part of the world the specimens of this species occur. If this conclusion is warranted, it illuminates our understanding of civilization itself.

Most states systems have ended in universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the system. The examples are so abundant that we must ask two questions: Is there any states system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect any states system to culminate in this way? ... It might be argued that every state system can only maintain its existence on the balance of power, that the latter is inherently unstable, and that sooner or later its tensions and conflicts will be resolved into a monopoly of power.

The earliest thinker to approach the phenomenon of universal empire from a theoretical point of view was Polybius (2:3):

Atomic bomb and empire

Reves added "Postscript" to the Anatomy, opening: "A few weeks after the publication of this book, the first atomic bomb exploded over the city of Hiroshima…" This new physical fact however has changed nothing in the political situation. The world empire remains inevitable and nothing else in the book would have been said differently had it been written after August 6, 1945. Not much chance we have to establish world government before the next horrible war between the two superpowers and whoever is victorious would establish the world empire. The book sold an exceptional 800,000 copies in thirty languages, was endorsed by Albert Einstein and numerous other prominent figures, and in 1950 Reves was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The year after the War and in the first year of the nuclear age, Einstein and British philosopher Bertrand Russell, known as prominent pacifists, outlined for the near future a perspective of world empire (world government established by force). Einstein believed that, unless world government is established by agreement, an imperial world government would come by war or wars. Russell expected a third World War to result in a world government under the empire of the United States and regretted that the United States is not enough “imperialistic” to launch a preventive nuclear war for this cause. Three years later, another prominent pacifist, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, generalized on the ancient Empires of Egypt, Babylon, Persia and Greece to imply for the modern world: "The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in the final struggle."

Russian colleague of Russell and Niebuhr, Georgy Fedotov, wrote in 1945: All empires are but stages on the way to the sole empire which must swallow all others. The only question is who will build it and on which foundations. Universal unity is the only alternative to annihilation. Unity by conference is utopian but unity by conquest by the strongest power is not and probably the uncompleted in this War will be completed in the next. "Pax Atlantica" is the best of possible outcomes.

Originally drafted as a secret study for the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor of the CIA) in 1944 and published as a book three years later, The Struggle for the World... by James Burnham concludes: If either of the two Superpowers wins, the result would be a universal empire which in our case would also be a world empire. The historical stage for a world empire had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of atomic weapons but these weapons make a world empire inevitable and imminent. "The atomic weapons ... will not permit the world to wait." Only a world empire can establish monopoly on atomic weapons and thus guarantee the survival of civilization. A world empire "is in fact the objective of the Third World War which, in its preliminary stages, has already began". The issue of a world empire "will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed, but one of them must be."

Circumscription theory

According to the circumscription theory of Robert Carneiro, "the more sharply circumscribed area, the more rapidly it will become politically unified." The Empires of Egypt, China and Japan are named the most durable political structures in human history. Correspondingly, these are the three most circumscribed civilizations in human history. The Empires of Egypt (established by Narmer c. 3000 BC) and China (established by Cheng in 221 BC) endured for over two millennia. Expert on comparative imperiology, Robert G. Wesson, emphasized the unique in world history "repetition of universal empires" in Egypt and China. German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck, criticizing the Western idea of progress, emphasized that China and Egypt remained at one particular stage of development for millennia. This stage was universal empire. The development of Egypt and China came to a halt once their empires "reached the limits of their natural habitat". Sinology does not recognize the Eurocentric view of the "inevitable" imperial fall; Egyptology and Japanology pose equal challenges.

Carneiro explored the Bronze Age civilizations. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth researched the next three millennia, comparing eight civilizations. They conclude: The "rigidity of the borders" contributed importantly to hegemony in every concerned case. Hence, "when the system's borders are rigid, the probability of hegemony is high".

The circumscription theory was stressed in the comparative studies of the Roman and Chinese Empires. The circumscribed Chinese Empire recovered from all falls, while the fall of Rome, by contrast, was fatal. "What counteracted this [imperial] tendency in Europe ... was a countervailing tendency for the geographical boundaries of the system to expand." If "Europe had been a closed system, some great power would eventually have succeeded in establishing absolute supremacy over the other states in the region".

The ancient Chinese system was relatively enclosed, whereas the European system began to expand its reach to the rest of the world from the onset of system formation... In addition, overseas provided outlet for territorial competition, thereby allowing international competition on the European continent to ... trump the ongoing pressure toward convergence.

In the 1945 book, The Precarious Balance, on four centuries of the European power struggle, Ludwig Dehio explained the durability of the European states system by its overseas expansion: "Overseas expansion and the system of states were born at the same time; the vitality that burst the bounds of the Western world also destroyed its unity." In a more famous 1945 book, Reves similarly argued that the era of outward expansion is forever closed and the historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers. Edward Carr causally linked the end of the overseas outlet for imperial expansion and World Wars. In the nineteenth century, he wrote during the Second World War, imperialist wars were waged against "primitive" peoples. "It was silly for European countries to fight against one another when they could still ... maintain social cohesion by continuous expansion in Asia and Africa. Since 1900, however, this has no longer been possible: "the situation has radically changed". Now wars are between "imperial powers."

Present

For Dominic Lieven, empire is all about unequal distribution of power and consequent domination. Thus the 2000s world order is more imperial than the 19th-century one because instead of several empire of roughly equal power there is one imperial superpower. ‘Empire’ has therefore replaced "anarchy." Chalmers Johnson argues that the US global network of hundreds of military bases already represents a global empire in its initial form:

For a major power, prosecution of any war that is not a defense of the homeland usually requires overseas military bases for strategic reasons. After the war is over, it is tempting for the victor to retain such bases and easy to find reasons to do so. Commonly, preparedness for a possible resumption of hostilities will be invoked. Over time, if a nation's aims become imperial, the bases form the skeleton of an empire.

Simon Dalby associates the network of bases with the Roman imperial system:

Looking at these impressive facilities which reproduce substantial parts of American suburbia complete with movie theatres and restaurant chains, the parallels with Roman garrison towns built on the Rhine, or on Hadrian's wall in England, where the remains are strikingly visible on the landscape, are obvious ... Less visible is the sheer scale of the logistics to keep garrison troops in residence in the far-flung reaches of empire ... That [military] presence literally builds the cultural logic of the garrison troops into the landscape, a permanent reminder of imperial control.

Kenneth Pomeranz and Harvard Historian Niall Ferguson share the above-cited views: "With American military bases in over 120 countries, we have hardly seen the end of empire." This "vast archipelago of US military bases … far exceeds 19th-century British ambitions. Britain's imperium consisted of specific, albeit numerous, colonies and clients; the American imperial vision is much more global…" The greatest conquerors who have ever lived only dreamed of a military presence as expansive as the United States has already achieved.

Conventional maps of US military deployments understate the extent of America's military reach. A Defense Department map of the world, which shows the areas of responsibility of the five major regional commands, suggests that America's sphere of military influence is now literally global ... The regional combatant commanders—the 'pro-consuls' of this imperium—have responsibility for swaths of territory beyond the wildest imaginings of their Roman predecessors.

Future

In 1945, historian Ludwig Dehio predicted global unification due to the circumscription of the global system, although he did not use this term. Being global, the system can neither expand nor be subject to external intrusion as the European states system had been for centuries:

In all previous struggles for supremacy, attempts to unite the European peninsula in a single state have been condemned to failure primarily through the intrusion of new forces from outside the old Occident. The Occident was an open area. But the globe was not, and, for that very reason, ultimately destined to be unified... And this very process [of unification] was clearly reflected in both World Wars.

Fifteen years later, Dehio confirmed his hypothesis: The European system owed its durability to its overseas outlet. "But how can a multiple grouping of world states conceivably be supported from outside in the framework of a finite globe?"

During the same time, Quincy Wright developed a similar concept. Balance-of-power politics has aimed less at preserving peace than at preserving the independence of states and preventing the development of world empire. In the course of history, the balance of power repeatedly re-emerged, but on ever-wider scale. Eventually, the scale became global. Unless we proceed to "interplanetary wars," this pattern can no longer continue. In spite of significant reversals, the "trend towards world unity" can "scarcely be denied." World unity appears to be "the limit toward which the process of world history seems to tend."

The same "interplanetary" motif is present also in the Anatomy of Peace: The era of outward expansion is forever closed. "Until and unless we are able to communicate with another planet, the theater of human history will be limited to geographically determined, constant and known dimensions." The historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers. Multiplied by modern technology, the centripetal forces will accomplish what the greatest empires of the past failed. "For the first time in human history, one power can conquer and rule the world."

The "Father of American Anthropology", Franz Boas, known for his historical particularism and cultural relativism, outlined the "inexorable laws of history" by which political units grow larger in size and smaller in number. The process began in the earliest times and has continued almost always in the same direction. In the long run, the tendency to unification has been more powerful than of disintegration. "Thus the history of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size." The progress in the direction of unification has been so regular and so marked that we must needs conclude that the same tendencies will govern our history in the future. Today the unity of the world is not less conceivable than the modern nations were in the early history. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for nothing before the "inexorable laws of history."