Evolution of positions
In its early days, Hamas functioned as a social-religious charity center. Its members armed themselves for the ongoing resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and in August 1988 published their first charter in which Hamas stated that "Israel" should be "eliminated" through a "clash with the enemies", a "struggle against Zionism" and "conflict with Israel". They wrote that 'Palestine', that is all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea), should be "liberated" from "Zionism" and transformed into an Islamic Waqf (Islamic charitable endowment) in which "followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety". Practically speaking, Hamas is and was at war with Israel's army (later also attacking Israeli civilians) since the spring of 1989, initially as part of the First Intifada, a general protest movement that gradually turned more riotous and violent.
In December 1992, Israeli authorities deported more than 400 Palestinians, suspected to be members of Hamas to Southern Lebanon. In 1999, the Hamas leadership, in a memorandum to European diplomats, proposed a long-term ceasefire with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal of military troops and civilian illegal settlements from West Bank and Gaza Strip, release of all Palestinian prisoners, and the right of Palestinian self-determination (see also section Truce proposals). Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, who was assassinated by Israel in 2004, at unreported date has offered Israel a ten-year hudna (truce, armistice) in return for establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Yassin later added, the hudna could be renewed, even for longer periods, but would never signal a recognition of Israel.
In 2005, Hamas signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration, which confirms "the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital" (etc.), aiming to reconcile several Palestinian factions but not describing specific steps or strategies towards Israel.
In March 2006, after winning an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Hamas published its government program in which Hamas claimed sovereignty for the Palestinian territories but did not repeat its claim to all of mandatory Palestine, instead declared their willingness to have contacts with Israel "in all mundane affairs: business, trade, health, and labor". The program further stated: "The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction, nor the government, but a decision for the Palestinian people." Since then until today, spokesmen of Hamas seem to disagree about their attitudes towards Israel, and debates are running as to whether the original 1988 Hamas charter has since March 2006 become obsolete and irrelevant or on the contrary still spells out Hamas's genuine and ultimate goals (see: 1988 Hamas charter, § Relevance).
The March 2006 Hamas legislative program was further explained on 6 June 2006 by Hamas' MP Riad Mustafa: "Hamas will never recognize Israel", but if a popular Palestinian referendum would endorse a peace agreement including recognition of Israel, "we would of course accept their verdict".
Also on 6 June 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and at that time Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, sent a letter to US President George W. Bush (via University of Maryland's Jerome Segal), stating: "We are so concerned about stability and security in the area that we don't mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and offering a truce for many years", and asking Bush for a dialogue with the Hamas government. A similar message he sent to Israel's leaders. Haniyeh had reportedly proposed a fifty-year armistice. Neither Washington nor Israel replied. Nuancing sheikh Ahmed Yassin's statements before 2004 about a hudna (truce) with Israel (see above), Hamas's (former) senior adviser Ahmed Yousef has said (at unknown date) that a "hudna" (truce, armistice) is more than a ceasefire and "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."
On 28 June 2006, Hamas signed the second version of (originally) 'the Palestinians' Prisoners Document' which supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967". This document also recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people", and states that "the negotiations" should be conducted by PLO and President of the Palestinian National Authority and eventual agreements must be ratified by either the Palestinian National Council or a general referendum "held in the homeland and the Diaspora". Leila Seurat also notes that this document "implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders, agreed on the construction of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital and accepted limitations to the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967", and was produced following consultations with the entire Political Bureau.
In an August 2006 interview with The New York Times, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and then Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, said: "We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm." In November 2006, Hamas again proposed a temporary but long lasting truce to Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.
In February 2007, Hamas signed the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement, stressing "the importance of national unity as basis for (...) confronting the occupation" and "activate and reform the PLO", but without further details about how to confront or deal with Israel. At the time of signing that 2007 agreement, Mousa Abu Marzook, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, underlined his view of the Hamas position: "I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli (amr wâqi') or, as the French say, a de facto recognition, but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state". More Hamas leaders, through the years, have made similar statements.
In June 2007, Hamas ousted the Fatah movement from the Gaza Strip, took control there, and since then Hamas occasionally fired rockets from the Gaza Strip on Israel, purportedly to retaliate Israeli aggression against the people of Gaza.
In April 2008, former US President Jimmy Carter met with Khaled Mashal, the recognized Hamas leader since 2004. Mashal said to Carter, Hamas would "accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders" and accept the right of Israel "to live as a neighbour" if such a deal would be approved by a referendum among the "Palestinians". Nevertheless, Mashal did not offer a unilateral ceasefire (as Carter had suggested him to do). The US State Department showed utter indifference for Mashal's new stance; Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert even refused to meet with Carter in Jerusalem, not to mention paying attention to the new Hamas stance.
On 19 June 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed to a six-month cease-fire, which Hamas declared finished at 18 December amidst mutual accusations of breaching the agreed conditions.
Meanwhile, in November 2008, in a meeting with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas senior official Ismail Haniyeh repeated what he had written in June 2006 to U.S. President George W. Bush but with one extra condition: "the Hamas government had agreed to accept a Palestinian state that followed the 1967 borders and to offer Israel a long-term hudna (truce), if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights" – a proposal which he said Israel had declined.
In September 2009, Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that Hamas would support any steps leading to a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders: "We would never thwart efforts to create an independent Palestinian state with borders [from] June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital."
In May 2010, Khaled Mashal, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau (thus Hamas' highest leader), again stated that a state "Israel" living next
to "a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967" would be acceptable for Hamas – but only if a referendum among "the Palestinian people" would endorse this arrangement. In November 2010, Ismail Haniyeh, also proposed a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, though added three further conditions: "resolution of the issue of refugees", "the release of Palestinian prisoners", and "Jerusalem as its capital"; and he made the same reservation as Mashal in May 2010 had made, that a Palestinian referendum needed to endorse this arrangement.
On 1 December 2010, Ismail Haniyeh (senior Hamas leader, see above), in a news conference in Gaza, repeated his November 2010 message: "We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees," but only if such arrangement would be endorsed by "a referendum" held among all Palestinians: in Gaza, West Bank, and the diaspora.
In May 2011, Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement in Cairo, agreeing to form a ('national unity') government and appoint the Ministers "in consensus between them", but it contained no remarks about how to confront or deal with Israel. In February 2012, Hamas and Fatah signed the Fatah–Hamas Doha Agreement, agreeing (again) to form an interim national consensus government, which (again) did not materialize.
Still in February 2012, according to the Palestinian Authority (either the Fatah branch in West Bank or the Hamas branch in Gaza), Hamas forswore the use of violence against Israel ("ceasefire", an Israeli news website called it), followed by a few weeks without violence between Hamas and Israel. But violence between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel, also involving Hamas, would soon resume.
On 1 May 2017, after much internal discussion, Hamas and its Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mashal published "A Document of General Principles and Policies", also known as the 2017 Hamas charter. In the new charter Hamas accepts a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel. When asked, Hamas leaders explained that "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Khaled Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now." However, Hamas fell short of formally repudiating the original 1988 charter. According to some analysts Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.
Around 2018, a Hamas finance minister has suggested that a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas [hudna] and a two-state settlement are the same". In 2021 Hamas organized and financed a conference among 250 Gaza citizens about the future management of the State of Palestine following the takeover of Israel which was predicted to come soon. According to the conclusions of the conference, the Jewish Israeli fighters would be killed, while the peaceful individuals could be integrated or be allowed to leave. At the same time the highly skilled and educated would be prevented from leaving. In 2020 Ismail Haniyeh said in an interview that one of the principles of Hamas was "Palestine from the sea to the river." In 2022, Yahya Sinwar cautioned Israelis that Hamas would one day "march through your walls to uproot your regime."
In the October 7 attacks, Hamas and associates murdered 767 civilians, killed a further 376 security personnel of the state of Israel and abducted 251 people from Israel to the Gaza Strip. Israel retaliated with warfare in the Gaza Strip, aiming at Hamas militants but also harming much civilian infrastructure and directly killing tens of thousands of civilians, more than 80 percent of casualties. A number of conflicting statements since then were made by Hamas senior leaders regarding the Hamas policy towards Israel.
On 24 October, Ghazi Hamad—member of the decision-making Hamas Political Bureau—explained the 7 October attack: "Israel is a country that has no place on our land. We must remove that country because it constitutes a security, military and political catastrophe to the Arab and Islamic nation". "We are called a nation of martyrs and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs". Hamad called the creation of the Jewish state "illogical": "(...) We are the victims of the occupation. Therefore, nobody should blame us for the things we do".
On 1 November 2023, Ismail Haniyeh, then incumbent highest Hamas leader (but assassinated by Israel 31 July 2024), stated that if Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the Gaza war, if humanitarian corridors would be opened, and aid would be allowed into Gaza,
Hamas would be "ready for political negotiations for a two-state solution with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine". Haniyeh also praised the support of movements in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon for the Palestinian struggle.
In January 2024 Khaled Mashal, a former Hamas leader, slighted "The West" and "the two-state solution", saying "The 1967 borders represent 21% of Palestine, which is practically one fifth of its land, so this cannot be accepted", and adding that "our right in Palestine from the sea to the river" cannot be waived. However, he reiterated that Hamas "accepts a state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, with complete independence and with the right of return without recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."
Hamas Member of Parliament Khalil al-Hayya, also deputy chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, told the Associated Press in April 2024 that Hamas is willing to agree to a truce of five years or more with Israel and that it would lay down its weapons and convert into a political party if an independent Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders. The Associated Press considered this a "significant concession", but presumed that Israel would not even want to consider this scenario following the October 2023 attack.
The vision that Hamas articulated in its original 1988 charter resembles the vision of certain Zionist groups regarding the same territory, as noted by several authors. This may suggest that Hamas's views were inspired by those Zionist perspectives.
Several (other) authors have interpreted the 1988 Hamas charter as a call for "armed struggle against Israel".
In 2009, Taghreed El-khodary and Ethan Bronner, writing in the New York Times, said that Hamas' position is that it doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist, but is willing to accept as a compromise a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.
Writing for Middle Eastern Studies, Imad Alsoos says that Hamas has both a short and long-term objective: "The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety. Establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (as part of a hudna deal) would be Hamas's interim solution, during which Israel would not be recognized.
In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel.
Journalist Zaki Chehab wrote in 2007 that Hamas's public concessions following the 2006 elections were "window-dressing" and that the organisation would never recognize Israel's right to exist.
As to the question whether Hamas would be capable to enter into a long-term non-aggression treaty with Israel without being disloyal to their understanding of Islamic law and God's word, The Atlantic magazine columnist Jeffrey Goldberg in January 2009 stated: "I tend to think not, though I've noticed over the years a certain plasticity of belief among some Hamas ideologues. Also, this is the Middle East, so anything is possible".
Professor Mohammed Ayoob in his 2020 book, while discussing the 2017 Hamas charter, stated that "acceptance of the 1967 borders can be interpreted as a de facto acceptance of the preconditions for a two-state solution".
