International Criminal Court

International Criminal Court — latest news, discussion & facts — IJR

Background

The establishment of an international tribunal to judge political leaders accused of international crimes was first proposed during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 following the First World War by the Commission of Responsibilities. The issue was addressed again at a conference held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1937, which resulted in the conclusion of the first convention stipulating the establishment of a permanent international court to try acts of international terrorism. The convention was signed by 13 states, but none ratified it, so the convention never entered into force.

Following the Second World War, the allied powers established two ad hoc tribunals to prosecute Axis leaders accused of war crimes. The International Military Tribunal, which sat in Nuremberg and is often referred to as the "Nuremberg trials", prosecuted German leaders, including for Nazi perpetration of The Holocaust, while the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo prosecuted Japanese leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly first recognised the need for a permanent international court to deal with atrocities of the kind prosecuted after World War II. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Law Commission (ILC) drafted two statutes by the early 1950s, but these were shelved during the Cold War, which made the establishment of an international criminal court politically unrealistic.

Benjamin B. Ferencz, an investigator of Nazi war crimes after World War II and the chief prosecutor for the United States Army at the Einsatzgruppen trial, became a vocal advocate of the establishment of international rule of law and of an international criminal court. In his book Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace (1975), he advocated for the establishment of such a court. Another leading proponent was Robert Kurt Woetzel, a German-born professor of international law, who co-edited Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court in 1970 and created the Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1971.

Formal proposal and establishment

In June 1989, A. N. R. Robinson, who would later become Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, revived the idea of a permanent international criminal court by proposing the creation of a tribunal to address the illegal drug trade. In response, the General Assembly tasked the ILC with once again drafting a statute for a permanent court.

While work began on the draft, the UN Security Council established two ad hoc tribunals in the early 1990s: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, created in 1993 in response to large-scale atrocities committed by armed forces during the Yugoslav Wars, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, created in 1994 following the Rwandan genocide. The creation of these tribunals further highlighted to many the need for a permanent international criminal court.

In 1994, the ILC presented its final draft statute for the International Criminal Court to the General Assembly and recommended that a conference be convened to negotiate a treaty that would serve as the Court's statute. To consider major substantive issues in the draft statute, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995. After considering the Committee's report, the General Assembly created the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the ICC to prepare a consolidated draft text. From 1996 to 1998, six sessions of the Preparatory Committee were held at the United Nations headquarters in New York City, during which NGOs provided input and attended meetings under the umbrella organisation of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). In January 1998, the Bureau and coordinators of the Preparatory Committee convened for an inter-sessional meeting in Zutphen in the Netherlands to technically consolidate and restructure the draft articles into a draft.

Finally, the General Assembly convened a conference in Rome in June 1998, with the aim of finalising the treaty to serve as the Court's statute. On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by a vote of 120 to seven, with 21 countries abstaining. The seven countries that voted against the treaty were China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the U.S., and Yemen.

Israel's opposition to the treaty stemmed from the inclusion in the list of war crimes "the action of transferring population into occupied territory", a provision added during the Rome Conference at the insistence of Arab countries with the specific intention of targeting Israeli citizens.The UN General Assembly voted on 9 December 1999 and again on 12 December 2000 to endorse the ICC. Following 60 ratifications, the Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 and the International Criminal Court was formally established. The first bench of 18 judges was elected by the Assembly of States Parties in February 2003. They were sworn in at the inaugural session of the Court on 11 March 2003.

The Court issued its first arrest warrants on 8 July 2005, and the first pre-trial hearings were held in 2006.

The Court issued its first judgment in 2012 when it found Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo guilty of war crimes related to using child soldiers.

In 2010, the states parties of the Rome Statute held the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda. The Review Conference led to the adoption of two resolutions that amended the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Resolution 5 amended Article 8 on war crimes, criminalising the use of certain kinds of weapons in non-international conflicts whose use was already forbidden in international conflicts. Resolution 6, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Statute, provided the definition and a procedure for jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

State parties

As of January 2025, 125 states are parties to the Statute of the Court, including all the countries of South America, nearly all of Europe, most of Oceania and roughly half of Africa. Burundi and the Philippines were member states, but later withdrew effective 27 October 2017 and 17 March 2019, respectively. A further 29 countries have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. The law of treaties obliges these states to refrain from "acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty until they declare they do not intend to become a party to the treaty. Four signatory states have informed the UN Secretary General that they no longer intend to become states parties and, as such, have no legal obligations arising from their signature of the Statute; they are Israel in 2002, the United States on 6 May 2002, Sudan on 26 August 2008, and Russia on 30 November 2016. Forty-one other states have neither signed nor acceded to the Rome Statute. Some of them, including China and India, are critical of the Court.

The Court's management oversight and legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties, consists of one representative from each state party. Each state party has one vote and "every effort" has to be made to reach decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, decisions are made by vote. The Assembly is presided over by a president and two vice-presidents, who are elected by the members to three-year terms.

The Assembly meets in full session once a year, alternating between New York and The Hague, and may also hold special sessions where circumstances require. Sessions are open to observer states and non-governmental organisations.

The Assembly elects the judges and prosecutors, decides the Court's budget, adopts important texts (such as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), and provides management oversight to the other organs of the Court. Article 46 of the Rome Statute allows the Assembly to remove from office a judge or prosecutor who "is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties" or "is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute".

The states parties cannot interfere with the judicial functions of the Court. Disputes concerning individual cases are settled by the Judicial Divisions.

The Bureau of the Assembly assists the Assembly in discharging its responsibilities between the Assembly's plenary sessions. The Assembly elects a Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents, and 18 members elected for three-year terms, chosen with regard to equitable geographical distribution and adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world. The Bureau meets as often as necessary (typically several times a year) and handles preparatory and administrative work, oversight, and coordination so that the full Assembly—which meets only once a year—can function effectively. It also operates through subsidiary working groups, notably The Hague Working Group and the New York Working Group.

Organs

The ICC has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.

The President is the most senior judge chosen by the eighteen judges in the Judicial Division.

The Judicial Division is composed of eighteen judges and hears cases before the Court.

The Office of the Prosecutor is headed by the Prosecutor, who investigates crimes and initiates criminal proceedings before the Judicial Division.

The Registry is headed by the Registrar and is charged with managing all the administrative functions of the ICC, including the headquarters, detention unit, and public defence office.

The ICC employs over 900 personnel from roughly 100 countries and conducts proceedings in English and French.

The Presidency is responsible for the proper administration of the Court (apart from the Office of the Prosecutor). It comprises the President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents—three judges of the Court who are elected to the Presidency by their fellow judges for a maximum of two three-year terms.

Song Sang-hyun was the President of the ICC from 2009 to 2015. As of March 2024, the President is Tomoko Akane from Japan, who took office on 11 March 2024, succeeding Piotr Hofmański. Her first term will expire in 2027.

The Judicial Divisions consist of the 18 judges of the Court, organised into three chambers—the Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber—which carry out the judicial functions of the Court. Judges are elected to the Court by the Assembly of States Parties. They serve nine-year terms and are not generally eligible for re-election. All judges must be nationals of states parties to the Rome Statute, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state. They must be "persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices".

The Prosecutor or any person being investigated or prosecuted may request the disqualification of a judge from "any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground". Any request for the disqualification of a judge from a particular case is decided by an absolute majority of the other judges. Judges may be removed from office if "found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties" or is unable to exercise his or her functions. The removal of a judge requires both a two-thirds majority of the other judges and a two-thirds majority of the states parties.

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is responsible for conducting investigations and prosecutions. It is headed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who is assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors. The Rome Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently; as such, no member of the Office may seek or act on instructions from any external source, such as states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations or individuals.

The Prosecutor may open an investigation under three circumstances:

when a situation is referred by a state party;

when a situation is referred by the United Nations Security Council, acting to address a threat to international peace and security; or

when the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises the prosecutor to open an investigation on the basis of information received from other sources, such as individuals or non-governmental organisations.

Any person being investigated or prosecuted may request the disqualification of a prosecutor from any case "in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground". Requests for the disqualification of prosecutors are decided by the Appeals Chamber. A prosecutor may be removed from office by an absolute majority of the states parties through a finding "to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties" or is unable to exercise his or her functions.

Lead prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina, in office from 2003 to 2012, was succeeded in the role by Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, who served from 16 June 2012 to 16 June 2021. (She was elected to the nine-year term on 12 December 2011.)

On 12 February 2021, British barrister Karim Khan was selected in a secret ballot against three other candidates to serve as lead prosecutor as of 16 June 2021. As a British barrister, Khan had headed the United Nations' special investigative team when it looked into Islamic State crimes in Iraq. At the ICC, he had been lead defence counsel on cases from Kenya, Sudan and Libya.

The Office of the Prosecutor occasionally publishes policy papers that put forth the considerations given to topics the office focuses on, and often the criteria for case selection. While a policy paper does not give the Court jurisdiction over a new category of crimes, it promises what the Office of Prosecutor will consider when selecting cases in the upcoming term of service. OTP's policy papers are subject to revision.

The following papers have been published since the start of the ICC:

1 September 2007: Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice

12 April 2010: Policy Paper on Victims' Participation

1 November 2013: Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations

20 June 2014: Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes

15 September 2016: Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation

15 November 2016: Policy on Children

The paper published in September 2016 announced that the ICC will focus on environmental crimes when selecting cases. The Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, "inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land". This has been interpreted as a major shift in environmental law and a move with significant effects.

The Registry is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court. This includes, among other things,

The administration of legal aid matters, court management, victims and witnesses matters, defence counsel, detention unit, and the traditional services provided by administrations in international organisations, such as finance, translation, building management, procurement and personnel.

The Registry is headed by the Registrar, who is elected by the judges to a five-year term. As of April 2023 the Registrar is Osvaldo Zavala Giler.

Crimes of aggression

Article 8 bis defines crimes of aggression. The Statute originally provided that the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time as the states parties agreed on a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which it could be prosecuted. Such an amendment was adopted at the first review conference of the ICC in Kampala, Uganda, in June 2010. This amendment specified that the ICC would not be allowed to exercise jurisdiction of the crime of aggression until two further conditions had been satisfied: (1) the amendment has entered into force for 30 states parties and (2) on or after 1 January 2017, the Assembly of States Parties has voted in favour of allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction. On 26 June 2016 the first condition was satisfied and the state parties voted in favour of allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction on 14 December 2017. The Court's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of aggression was accordingly activated on 17 July 2018.

The Statute, as amended, defines the crime of aggression as "the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations." The Statute defines an "act of aggression" as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations." The article also contains a list of seven acts of aggression, which are identical to those in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1974 and include the following acts when committed by one state against another state:

Invasion or attack by armed forces against territory

Military occupation of territory

Annexation of territory

Bombardment against territory

Use of any weapons against territory

Blockade of ports or coasts

Attack on the land, sea, or air forces or marine and air fleets

The use of armed forces which are within the territory of another state by agreement, but in contravention of the conditions of the agreement

Allowing territory to be used by another state to perpetrate an act of aggression against a third state

Sending armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force

Victim participation

One of the great innovations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence is the series of rights granted to victims. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims have the possibility under the Statute to present their views and observations before the Court.

Participation before the Court may occur at various stages of proceedings and may take different forms, although it will be up to the judges to give directions as to the timing and manner of participation.

Participation in the Court's proceedings will in most cases take place through a legal representative and will be conducted "in a manner which is not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial".

The victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute provide victims with the opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate, some form of reparation for their suffering. It is the aim of this attempted balance between retributive and restorative justice that, it is hoped, will enable the ICC to not only bring criminals to justice but also help the victims themselves obtain some form of justice. Justice for victims before the ICC comprises both procedural and substantive justice, by allowing them to participate and present their views and interests, so that they can help to shape truth, justice and reparations outcomes of the Court.

Article 43(6) establishes a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide "protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses." Article 68 sets out procedures for the "Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings." The Court has also established an Office of Public Counsel for Victims, to provide support and assistance to victims and their legal representatives.

Cooperation by states not party to Rome Statute

One of the principles of international law is that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for third states without their consent, and this is also enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The cooperation of the non-party states with the ICC is envisioned by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to be of a voluntary nature. States not acceded to the Rome Statute might still be subject to an obligation to cooperate with the ICC in certain cases. When a case is referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council all UN member states are obliged to cooperate, since its decisions are binding for all of them. Also, there is an obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, which stems from the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, which reflects the absolute nature of international humanitarian law.

In relation to cooperation in investigation and evidence gathering, it is implied from the Rome Statute that the consent of a non-party state is a prerequisite for the Prosecutor to conduct an investigation within its territory, and it seems that it is even more necessary for him to observe any reasonable conditions raised by that state, since such restrictions exist for states party to the Statute. Taking into account the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (which worked with the principle of primacy, instead of complementarity) in relation to cooperation, some scholars have expressed their pessimism as to the possibility of the ICC obtaining the cooperation of non-party states. As for the actions that the ICC can take toward non-party states that do not cooperate, the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court may inform the Assembly of States Parties or Security Council, when the matter was referred by it, when a non-party state refuses to cooperate after it has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court.

Trial history

The Court's Pre-Trial Chambers have publicly indicted 76 people. Proceedings against 40 are ongoing: 34 are at large as fugitives, two cases are in the pre-trial stage, one person is on trial, and three cases are in the appeals stage. Proceedings against 36 have been completed: three are serving sentences, seven have finished sentences, four have been acquitted, eight have had the charges against them dismissed, five have had the charges against them withdrawn, and nine have died before the conclusion of the proceedings against them.

The indicted individuals include Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony, former President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, Libyan head of state Muammar Gaddafi, President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2015, several Congolese individuals were tried by the ICC. Thomas Lubanga was convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, Germain Katanga to 12 years, and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted.

The judgment of Jean-Pierre Bemba was rendered in March 2016. Bemba was convicted on two counts of crimes against humanity and three counts of war crimes. This marked the first time the ICC convicted someone of sexual violence as they added rape to his conviction. Bemba's convictions were overturned by the Court's Appeal Chamber in June 2018. The Court refused to compensate Bemba for losses suffered by him during his 10 years of imprisonment. It has been argued that this decision raises important questions about the court's present powers.

Ntaganda (DR Congo) was convicted to 30 years for crimes against humanity. The Bemba et al. OAJ case and the Laurent Gbagbo-Blé Goudé trial in the Côte d'Ivoire situation ended in acquittals. The Banda trial in the situation of Darfur, Sudan, was scheduled to begin in 2014 but the start date was vacated.

Charges against Malian Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi have been confirmed and he was sentenced to nine years in prison. On 25 November 2021, his sentence was commuted to 7 years in prison, and he was released on 18 September 2022. Ugandan Dominic Ongwen has been convicted to a prison sentence of 25 years.

On 6 July 2020, two Uyghur activist groups filed a complaint with the ICC calling for it to investigate PRC officials for crimes against Uyghurs, including allegations of genocide. In December 2020, ICC prosecutors rejected the complaint, stating that the ICC did not have jurisdictional basis to proceed.

On 31 October 2023, the Israeli families of over 34 victims of the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, filed an Article 15 communication with the ICC prosecutor's office urging an investigation into the killings and abductions, and the ICC confirmed the receipt of the filing. Reporters Without Borders also lodged a complaint regarding the deaths of eight Palestinian journalists in the Gaza Strip during Israel's bombardment, as well as an Israeli journalist killed during a surprise attack by Hamas in southern Israel.

On 17 March 2023, ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights in Russia Maria Lvova-Belova for child abductions in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia denounced the arrest warrants as "outrageous". Putin became the first head of state of a U.N. Security Council Permanent Member to be the subject of an ICC arrest warrant. Although Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016, and is thus not a participant in the ICC nor under its jurisdiction, Putin can be charged for actions against Ukraine, which only became a full state party to the Statute on 1 January 2025, because it had previously accepted the Court's jurisdiction for an indefinite period starting from 21 November 2013. Should Putin travel to a state party, he can be arrested by local authorities. Later in 2023, Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs retaliated by placing several ICC officials on its wanted list. In March 2024, the ICC issued two more arrest warrants, for Sergey Kobylash, the commander of the Long-Range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and Viktor Sokolov, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet over their role in war crimes in Ukraine. In December 2025, the Moscow City Court sentenced the chief prosecutor Karim Khan, the first vice president Rosario Salvatore Aitala and seven others judges of the ICC in absentia to prison terms of up to 15 years each.

On 20 May 2024, the ICC's chief prosecutor Karim Khan announced his intention to seek arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant, leader of Hamas Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Al Qassem Brigades Mohammed Deif, and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in connection to war crimes committed in the Israel-Hamas war. On 21 November, warrants were formally issued for Netanyahu, Gallant and Deif. Warrants for Haniyeh and Sinwar were withdrawn following confirmation of their deaths in July and October respectively. In February 2025, ICC canceled arrest warrant issued against Hamas’s late military chief Muhammad Deif, who was killed in Gaza in July 2024.

On 23 January 2025, the ICC's chief prosecutor Karim Khan announced requests for arrest warrants against Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and the chief justice of Afghanistan Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity of the oppression and persecution of Afghan women and girls, who have been deprived of the freedom of movement, the rights to control their bodies, to education, and to a private and family life. Alleged resistance and opposition are brutally suppressed with murder, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, since 2021. On 8 July 2025, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber II issued the requested arrest warrants. On 5 October 2026 the ICC unsealed arrest warrants for Afghan Education Minister Habibullah Agha, and Higher Education Minister Neda Mohammad Nadeem, accusing them of crimes against humanity for denying Afghanistan's women and girls over 12 their rights to an education.

Nongovernmental organisations

During the 1970s and 1980s, international human rights and humanitarian Nongovernmental Organisations (or NGOs) began to proliferate at exponential rates. Concurrently, the quest to find a way to punish international crimes shifted from being the exclusive responsibility of legal experts to being shared with international human rights activism.

NGOs helped birth the ICC through advocacy and championing for the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity. NGOs closely monitor the organisation's declarations and actions, ensuring that the work that is being executed on behalf of the ICC is fulfilling its objectives and responsibilities to civil society. According to Benjamin Schiff, "From the Statute Conference onward, the relationship between the ICC and the NGOs has probably been closer, more consistent, and more vital to the Court than have analogous relations between NGOs and any other international organisation."

There are a number of NGOs working on a variety of issues related to the ICC. The NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court has served as a sort of umbrella for NGOs to coordinate with each other on similar objectives related to the ICC. The CICC has 2,500 member organisations in 150 countries. The original steering committee included representatives from the World Federalist Movement, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and No Peace Without Justice. Today, many of the NGOs with which the ICC cooperates are members of the CICC. These organisations come from a range of backgrounds, spanning from major international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, to smaller, more local organisations focused on peace and justice missions. Many work closely with states, such as the International Criminal Law Network, founded and predominantly funded by the Hague municipality and the Dutch Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. The CICC also claims organisations that are themselves federations, such as the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH).

CICC members subscribe to three principles that permit them to work under the umbrella of the CICC, so long as their objectives match them:

Promoting worldwide ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC

Maintaining the integrity of the Rome Statute of the ICC, and

Ensuring the ICC will be as fair, effective and independent as possible

The NGOs that work under the CICC do not normally pursue agendas exclusive to the work of the Court, rather they may work for broader causes, such as general human rights issues, victims' rights, gender rights, rule of law, conflict mediation, and peace. The CICC coordinates their efforts to improve the efficiency of NGOs' contributions to the Court and to pool their influence on major common issues. From the ICC side, it has been useful to have the CICC channel NGO contacts with the Court so that its officials do not have to interact individually with thousands of separate organisations.

NGOs have been crucial to the evolution of the ICC, as they assisted in the creation of the normative climate that urged states to seriously consider the Court's formation. Their legal experts helped shape the Statute, while their lobbying efforts built support for it. They advocate Statute ratification globally and work at expert and political levels within member states for passage of necessary domestic legislation. NGOs are greatly represented at meetings for the Assembly of States Parties, and they use the ASP meetings to press for decisions promoting their priorities. Many of these NGOs have reasonable access to important officials at the ICC because of their involvement during the Statute process. They are engaged in monitoring, commenting upon, and assisting in the ICC's activities.

The ICC often depends on NGOs to interact with local populations. The Registry Public Information Office personnel and Victims Participation and Reparations Section officials hold seminars for local leaders, professionals and the media to spread the word about the Court. These are the kinds of events that are often hosted or organised by local NGOs. Because there can be challenges with determining which of these NGOs are legitimate, CICC regional representatives often have the ability to help screen and identify trustworthy organisations.

NGOs are also "sources of criticism, exhortation and pressure upon" the ICC. The ICC heavily depends on NGOs for its operations. Although NGOs and states cannot directly impact the judicial nucleus of the organisation, they can impart information on crimes, can help locate victims and witnesses, and can promote and organise victim participation. NGOs outwardly comment on the Court's operations, "push for expansion of its activities especially in the new justice areas of outreach in conflict areas, in victims' participation and reparations, and in upholding due-process standards and defence 'equality of arms' and so implicitly set an agenda for the future evolution of the ICC." The relatively uninterrupted progression of NGO involvement with the ICC may mean that NGOs have become repositories of more institutional historical knowledge about the ICC than its national representatives, and have greater expertise than some of the organisation's employees themselves. While NGOs look to mould the ICC to satisfy the interests and priorities that they have worked for since the early 1990s, they unavoidably press against the limits imposed upon the ICC by the states that are members of the organisation. NGOs can pursue their own mandates, irrespective of whether they are compatible with those of other NGOs, while the ICC must respond to the complexities of its own mandate as well as those of the states and NGOs.

Another issue has been that NGOs possess "exaggerated senses of their ownership over the organisation and, having been vital to and successful in promoting the Court, were not managing to redefine their roles to permit the Court its necessary independence." Additionally, because there does exist such a gap between the large human rights organisations and the smaller peace-oriented organisations, it is difficult for ICC officials to manage and gratify all of their NGOs. "ICC officials recognize that the NGOs pursue their own agendas, and that they will seek to pressure the ICC in the direction of their own priorities rather than necessarily understanding or being fully sympathetic to the myriad constraints and pressures under which the Court operates." Both the ICC and the NGO community avoid criticising each other publicly or vehemently, although NGOs have released advisory and cautionary messages regarding the ICC. They avoid taking stances that could potentially give the Court's adversaries, particularly the U.S., more motive to berate the organisation.

African accusations of Western imperialism

The ICC has been accused of bias and of being a tool of Western imperialism, only punishing leaders from small, weak states while ignoring crimes committed by richer and more powerful states. This sentiment has been expressed particularly by African leaders due to an alleged disproportionate focus of the Court on Africa, while it claims to have a global mandate. Until January 2016, all nine situations which the ICC had been investigating were in African countries.

African critics have suggested the ICC is acting as a neocolonial force seeking to further empower Western political and extractive interests in Africa. Scholar Awol Allo has described the court's underlying problem that has led to these challenges with Africa as not overt racism, but Eurocentrism. Another analysis suggests that African states are motivated by concerns over Africa's place in the world order: the problem is the sovereign inequality displayed by the ICC prosecutor's focus.

The prosecution of Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta (both charged before coming into office) led to the Kenyan parliament passing a motion calling for Kenya's withdrawal from the ICC, and the country called on the other 33 African states party to the ICC to withdraw their support, an issue which was discussed at a special African Union (AU) summit in October 2013.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visited Kenya, South Africa, China, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Qatar and several other countries despite an outstanding ICC warrant for his arrest but was not arrested; he said that the charges against him are "exaggerated" and that the ICC was a part of a "Western plot" against him. Ivory Coast's government opted not to transfer former first lady Simone Gbagbo to the court but to instead try her at home. Rwanda's ambassador to the African Union, Joseph Nsengimana, argued that, "It is not only the case of Kenya. We have seen international justice become more and more a political matter." Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused the ICC of "mishandling complex African issues". Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, at the time AU chairman, told the UN General Assembly at the General debate of the sixty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly: "The manner in which the ICC has been operating has left a very bad impression in Africa. It is totally unacceptable."

The ICC has denied the charge of disproportionately targeting African leaders and claims to stand up for victims wherever they may be.

African Union (AU) withdrawal proposal

South African President Jacob Zuma said the perceptions of the ICC as "unreasonable" led to the calling of the special AU summit on 13 October 2015. Botswana is a notable supporter of the ICC in Africa. At the summit, the AU did not endorse the proposal for a collective withdrawal from the ICC due to a lack of support for the idea. The summit concluded that serving heads of state should not be put on trial and that the Kenyan cases should be deferred. Ethiopian former Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom said: "We have rejected the double standard that the ICC is applying in dispensing international justice." Despite these calls, the ICC went ahead with requiring William Ruto to attend his trial. The UNSC was then asked to consider deferring the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto for a year, but this was rejected. In November, the ICC's Assembly of State Parties responded to Kenya's calls for an exemption for sitting heads of state by agreeing to consider amendments to the Rome Statute to address the concerns.

On 7 October 2016, Burundi announced that it would leave the ICC after the court began investigating political violence in that nation. In the two weeks that followed, South Africa and The Gambia also announced their intention to leave the court, with Kenya and Namibia reportedly also considering departure. All three nations cited the fact that all 39 people indicted by the court over its history by that date had been African and that the court had made no effort to investigate war crimes tied to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following The Gambia's presidential election later that year, which ended the long rule of Yahya Jammeh, the new government rescinded its withdrawal notification. The High Court of South Africa ruled on 2 February 2017 that the South African government's notice to withdraw was unconstitutional and invalid. On 7 March 2017, the South African government formally revoked its intention to withdraw. The ruling ANC revealed on 5 July 2017 that its intention to withdraw stands.

Israel

In 2020, the +972 Magazine, based in Israel, reported political interference coming from Israel and the U.S. when Fatou Bensouda, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, announced that "there is legal basis to probe Israel and Palestinian groups over war crimes in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, and that her office was ready to investigate the matter". In 2018, when the Israeli government wanted to demolish the West Bank village of Khan al Ahmar, Bensouda explicitly warned Israel that doing so could be considered a 'war crime'. The Israeli government's response was to publicly defy the court, describing the prosecutor's statement as 'pure anti-Semitism' in Netanyahu's words.

The Guardian reported in 2024, on the basis of anonymous sources, that Israel had conducted a nine-year "war" against the ICC. These sources alleged that Israeli intelligence agencies were used to "surveil, hack, pressure, smear and allegedly threaten senior ICC staff in an effort to derail the court's inquiries." In particular, Yossi Cohen, director of Mossad at the time, allegedly threatened Bensouda and her family in an attempt to dissuade her from opening war crime enquiries against Israel. The anonymous sources are said to be familiar with disclosures Bensouda made to the ICC regarding the operation.

In November 2024, after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Gaza war, Netanyahu accused the ICC of antisemitism, while Gallant argued the Court set "a dangerous precedent against the right to self-defence and ethical warfare and encourages murderous terrorism." In that same November, Israel appealed the ICC warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant.

In November 2024, France argued that the arrest warrants for Israeli leaders are not valid because Israel is not a member of the ICC. In that same month, then-Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, announced that Canada would abide by the arrest warrants and arrest and deport Netanyahu if he entered that country. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said on various occasions that Italy would not arrest Prime Minister Netanyahu. In January 2025, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk guaranteed safe passage for senior Israeli officials, including Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to an event in Poland marking the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The majority of the Polish public disagreed with the government's decision not to arrest Netanyahu.

Germany's CDU leader Friedrich Merz criticised the ICC's decision to issue an arrest warrant for Netanyahu. In February 2025, one day after the 2025 German federal election, he announced his will to invite Netanyahu to Germany, "as an open challenge" to the decision of the ICC.

In April 2025, Netanyahu visited Hungary, a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. During the visit, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán announced that it would withdraw from the ICC, describing it as "politically biased". The withdrawal, which would become effective after one year's written notice, would result in Hungary joining Israel, the US, Russia, China and North Korea among nations which do not recognise the ICC's jurisdiction. This move drew criticism from human rights organisations and strained Hungary's relations within the European Union, where all member states are ICC members. However, following the election of Prime Minister Péter Magyar in 2026, the new government revoked its withdrawal from the ICC, and remained a member.

Russia

On 17 March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russian commissioner for children's rights, alleging responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of children during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

As of June 2024, the ICC has also issued arrest warrants for Viktor Sokolov, Sergey Kobylash, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, officers in the Russian military.

In March 2023, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that Russia did not recognise the Court's decision to issue an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin on account of war crimes in Ukraine and noted that Russia, like other countries which had not ratified the Rome Statute, did not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC, saying, "And accordingly, any decisions of this kind are null and void for the Russian Federation from the point of view of law."

State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin wrote on Telegram, "Yankees, hands off Putin!" calling the move evidence of Western "hysteria", and saying that "we regard any attacks on the President of the Russian Federation as aggression against our country".

South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor criticised the ICC for not having what she called an "evenhanded approach" to all leaders responsible for violations of international law. South Africa, which failed in its obligation to arrest visiting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in June 2015, invited Vladimir Putin to the 15th BRICS Summit in Durban. On 19 July 2023, South Africa announced that "by mutual agreement" Putin would not attend the summit. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended in Putin's place.

In the months following the arrest warrant for Putin being issued, Russia issued warrants for the arrest of multiple ICC officials, including the court's president Piotr Hofmański and its vice-president Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza. On 12 December 2025, a Moscow court sentenced to fifteen years in prison the aforementioned prosecutor Khan, the Italian vice-president of the Court, Salvatore Aitala, and seven other members of the panel that had issued the warrants against the Russian officials, who are therefore currently wanted by the Russian justice.

In advance of a visit by Putin to Mongolia on 3 September 2024, the ICC stated that Mongolia was obligated to place Putin under arrest, due to Mongolia being a signatory of the Rome Statute of the ICC. After failure to make the arrest, Mongolia was described by Ukraine as complicit in Putin's war crimes. Following the visit and the refusal to arrest Putin, the Mongolian government said that the issue of energy relations is critical to the country and that "Mongolia has always maintained a policy of neutrality in all its diplomatic relations, as demonstrated in our statements of record to date."

United States

United States president George W. Bush signed the American Service-Members' Protection Act (informally referred to as the Hague Invasion Act) to signify the United States' opposition to any possible future jurisdiction of the court or its tribunals. The act gives the President the power to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court". During the administration of Barack Obama, U.S. opposition to the ICC evolved to "positive engagement", but no effort was made to ratify the Rome Statute.

The subsequent Donald Trump administration was considerably more hostile to the Court, similar to the Bush administration, threatening prosecution and financial sanctions on ICC judges and staff in U.S. courts as well as imposing visa bans in response to any investigation against American nationals in connection to alleged crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. in Afghanistan. The threat included sanctions against any of over 120 countries that have ratified the Court for cooperating in the process. In November 2017, Fatou Bensouda advised the court to consider seeking charges for human rights abuses committed during the War in Afghanistan, such as alleged rapes and tortures by the U.S. Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, crimes against humanity committed by the Taliban, and war crimes committed by the Afghan National Security Forces. John Bolton, National Security Advisor of the United States, stated that the ICC had no jurisdiction over the U.S., which had not ratified the Rome Statute. In 2020, overturning the previous decision not to proceed, senior judges at the ICC authorised an investigation into the alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.

On 11 June 2020, Trump signed Executive Order 13928, imposing sanctions on ICC officials and employees, as well as their families, involved in investigating alleged crimes against humanity committed by U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan. This move was widely criticised by human rights groups. The U.S. ordered sanctions against the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and the ICC's head of Jurisdiction, Complementary, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochok, for an investigation into alleged war crimes by U.S. forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan since 2003. Attorney General William Barr said, "The US government has reason to doubt the honesty of the ICC. The Department of Justice has received substantial credible information that raises serious concerns about a long history of financial corruption and malfeasance at the highest levels of the office of the prosecutor.". The ICC responded with a statement expressing "profound regret at the announcement of further threats and coercive actions." "These attacks constitute an escalation and an unacceptable attempt to interfere with the rule of law and the Court's judicial proceedings", the statement said. "They are announced with the declared aim of influencing the actions of ICC officials in the context of the court's independent and objective investigations and impartial judicial proceedings."

On 30 September 2020, prominent United States human rights lawyers announced that they would sue Trump and his Administration—including Barr, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and OFAC director Andrea Gacki, and the departments they head—on the grounds that Trump's Executive Order 13928 order had gagged them, violating their right to free speech and impeding their work in trying to obtain justice on behalf of victims of war crimes. One of the plaintiffs, Diane Marie Amann, stated that, as a result of sanctions against the chief prosecutor at the ICC, she herself risked having her family assets seized if she continued to work for children who are bought and sold by traffickers, killed, tortured, sexually abused and forced to become child soldiers.

On 4 January 2021, U.S. District Judge Katherine Polk Failla in New York City issued a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration from imposing criminal or civil penalties against ICC personnel and those who support the court's work, including the plaintiffs. The sanctions were subsequently lifted by the Biden administration Secretary of State Antony Blinken in April 2021.

In 2023, the Biden administration welcomed the issuing of an ICC arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Joe Biden said that the issuing of the warrant "makes a very strong point".

In 2024, the Biden administration opposed an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over Israeli war crimes committed during the Gaza genocide. Biden denounced Netanyahu's arrest warrant as "outrageous". Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration would work with the US Congress on potential sanctions against the ICC. Prior to the issuing of the ICC's arrest warrant for Netanyahu, a group of US Republican senators sent a letter to ICC prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan that contained the warning "Target Israel and we will target you. If you move forward ... we will move to end all American support for the ICC, sanction your employees and associates, and bar you and your families from the United States. You have been warned." The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to sanction ICC officials on 4 June 2024.

On 9 January 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act by 243–140 to sanction the ICC in protest at its arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant issued in November 2024. On 6 February 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing economic and travel sanctions on individuals involved in ICC investigations targeting U.S. citizens and allies, notably Israel. This action coincided with Netanyahu visiting Washington. The sanctions entail freezing U.S. assets of designated individuals and prohibiting their entry into the United States. This move mirrors a similar stance taken during Trump's first term, when sanctions were applied to ICC officials over investigations into alleged war crimes by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

On 5 June 2025, the United States Department of State sanctioned four ICC judges—Solome Bossa of Uganda, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza of Peru, Reine Alapini-Gansou of Benin, and Beti Hohler of Slovenia—under President Trump's Executive Order 14203, "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court." The four judges were accused of engaging in efforts "to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute a protected person without consent of that person's country of nationality"— viz, of the United States or Israel. The sanctions effectively block those individuals' property interests and all other beneficial financial transactions within the United States.

On 11 December 2025 it was reported that the US was threatening the ICC with further sanctions unless it modifies its foundational charter to guarantee that it will not prosecute Trump and his senior officials, as well as to end its investigations into Israeli leaders regarding the genocide in Gaza and the conduct of American forces in Afghanistan.

On 13 July 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio published an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal announcing that the United States government would seek to "dismantle the ICC—brick by brick, if necessary." Subsequently, Venezuela and Chad notified the UN of their intention to withdraw. These decisions were welcomed by the United States.

On 18 August 2026, the United States imposed sanctions on ICC President Tomoko Akane of Japan and ICC Senior Trial Lawyer Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, pursuant to the same Executive Order 14203.

The United States Department of State argues that there are "insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and judges" and "insufficient protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses". The current law in the United States on the ICC is the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA), 116 Stat. 820. The ASPA authorises the President of the United States to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court". This authorisation has led the act to be nicknamed the "Hague Invasion Act", because the freeing of U.S. citizens by force might be possible only through military action. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief ICC prosecutor, stressed in 2011 the importance of politics in prosecutions: "You cannot say al-Bashir is in London, arrest him. You need a political agreement." Henry Kissinger has stated that the checks and balances are so weak that the prosecutor "has virtually unlimited discretion in practice".

On 10 September 2018, John R. Bolton, in his first major address as U.S. National Security Advisor, reiterated that the ICC lacks checks and balances, exercises "jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions", and has failed to "deter and punish atrocity crimes". The ICC, Bolton said, was "superfluous", given that "domestic judicial systems already hold American citizens to the highest legal and ethical standards". He added that the U.S. would do everything "to protect our citizens" should the ICC attempt to prosecute U.S. servicemen over detainee torture and abuse in Afghanistan. In that event, ICC judges and prosecutors would be barred from entering the U.S., their funds in the U.S. would be sanctioned and the U.S. "will prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system. We will do the same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans", Bolton said. He also criticised Palestinian efforts to bring Israel before the ICC over human rights abuses in the West Bank and Gaza.

About International Criminal Court

Article

Article

History

Background

Formal proposal and establishment

Operation

Establishing the court's jurisdiction

Structure

State parties

Organs

Prosecutable crimes

Genocide

Crimes against humanity

War crimes

Crimes of aggression

Offences against the administration of justice

Jurisdiction and admissibility

Territorial jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction

Temporal jurisdiction requirements

Admissibility requirements

Individual criminal responsibility

Procedure

Trial

Rights of the accused

Victim participation

Reparations

Cooperation by states not party to Rome Statute

Amnesty and national reconciliation processes

Facilities

Headquarters

Detention centre

Other offices

Digital infrastructure

Funding

Trial history

Investigations and preliminary examinations

Relationships

United Nations

Nongovernmental organisations

Criticism

Impartiality

Unintentional consequences

State cooperation

Principle of complementarity

Jurisdiction over corporations

State reactions and criticism

African states

African accusations of Western imperialism

African Union (AU) withdrawal proposal

Israel

Philippines

Qatar

Russia

United States

United Kingdom

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