Iran-United States relations

History

Early relations

American newspapers in the 1720s were uniformly pro-Iranian, especially during the revolt of Afghan emir Mahmud Hotak (r. 1722–1725) against the Safavid dynasty.

Political relations between Qajar Persia and the United States began when the Shah of Iran, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Iran's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan, to Washington, D.C. in 1856. In 1883, Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran; however, ambassadorial relations were not established until 1944.

The U.S. had little interest in Persian affairs, while the U.S. as a trustworthy outsider did not suffer. The Persians again sought the U.S. for help in straightening out its finances after World War I. This mission was opposed by powerful vested interests and eventually was withdrawn with its task incomplete.

During the Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1909, American Howard Baskerville died in Tabriz while fighting with a militia in a battle against royalist forces. After the Iranian parliament appointed United States financier Morgan Shuster as Treasurer General of Iran in 1911, an American was killed in Tehran by gunmen thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more active in supporting the Constitutional Revolution of Iran financially.

Arthur Millspaugh, an American economic adviser, was sent to Persia in 1923 as a private citizen to help reform its inefficient administration. His presence was seen by Persians as a means to attract foreign investment and counterbalance European influence. The mission ended in 1928 after Millspaugh fell out of favor with the shah.

Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the U.S. as a "third force" in their struggle to expel British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and to expel British and Russian influence from the country.

Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's Cossack Brigade, came to power after leading a British-backed coup in 1921 that overthrew the Qajar dynasty. He later declared himself shah (king) and took the name Reza Pahlavi. He launched modernization efforts, building a national railway and introducing secular education, while also censoring the press, suppressing unions and parties, and later banning the hijab in favor of Western dress.

1953 Iranian coup d'état

Until the outbreak of World War II, the United States had no active policy toward Iran. When the Cold War began, the United States was alarmed by the attempt by the Soviet Union to set up separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as well as its demand for military rights to the Dardanelles in 1946. This fear was enhanced by the loss of China to communism, the uncovering of Soviet spy rings, and the start of the Korean War.

In 1951, Iran nationalised its oil industry, effectively seizing the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). On April 28, 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected as Prime Minister by the Parliament of Iran.

The British planned to retaliate by attacking Iran, but U.S. President Harry S. Truman pressed Britain to moderate its position in the negotiations and to not invade Iran. American policies fostered a sense in Iran that the United States supported Mossadeq, along with optimism that the oil dispute would soon be resolved through "a series of innovative proposals" that would provide Iran with "significant amounts of economic aid." Mossadeq visited Washington, and the American government made "frequent statements expressing support for him."

At the same time, the United States honored the British embargo and, without Truman's knowledge, the Central Intelligence Agency station in Tehran had been "carrying out covert activities" against Mosaddeq and the National Front "at least since the summer of 1952".

In 1953, the U.S. and Britain orchestrated a coup to overthrow Iran's prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, fearing communist influence and economic instability after Iran nationalized its oil industry. The coup, led by the CIA and MI6, initially failed but succeeded on a second attempt. It reinstalled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who then received substantial U.S. financial and military support. The U.S. helped establish SAVAK, the Shah's brutal secret police, to maintain his rule. Many liberal Iranians believe that the coup and the subsequent U.S. support for the shah enabled the Shah's arbitrary rule, contributing to the "deeply anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution later.

After the coup, the United States played a central role in reorganizing Iran's oil sector. Under U.S. pressure, BP joined a consortium of Western companies to resume Iranian oil exports. The consortium operated on behalf of the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which retained formal ownership of Iran's oil and infrastructure. While Iran received 50% of the profits, U.S. companies collectively secured 40% of the remaining share. However, the consortium maintained operational control, barred Iranian oversight of its financial records, and excluded Iranians from its board. The agreement was part of a wider transition from British to American dominance in the region and worldwide.

U.S.–Shah alliance

In 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower launched Iran's nuclear program as part of Atoms for Peace program. In 1967, the U.S. helped Iran create its nuclear program by providing the Tehran Research Reactor, the nation's first nuclear reactor, as well as 5.58 kg of enriched uranium. Iran is one of the 51 original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968, and its Parliament ratified the treaty in February 1970. The participation of the U.S. and Western European governments continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iran's border with the Soviet Union, and its position as the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, made Iran a "pillar" of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1960, Iran joined Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to form the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), aiming to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies and reclaim control over national oil resources. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably. Beginning in the mid-1960s, this development "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" while strengthening the Iranian state's power over its own population. By the 1970s, surging OPEC profits gave the group substantial leverage over Western economies and elevated Iran's strategic value as a U.S. ally. According to scholar Homa Katouzian, this put the United States "in the contradictory position of being regarded" by the Iranian public "as the chief architect and instructor of the regime," while "its real influence" in domestic Iranian politics and policies "declined considerably".

Lee Driscoll and other historians have said that between 1969 and 1974 U.S. President Richard Nixon actively recruited the Shah as an American puppet and proxy. However, Richard Alvandi argues that it worked the other way around, with the Shah taking the initiative. President Nixon, who had first met the Shah in 1953, regarded him as a westernizing anticommunist statesman who deserved American support now that the British were withdrawing from the region. They met again in 1972 and the Shah agreed to buy large quantities of American military hardware, and took responsibility for ensuring political stability and fighting off Soviet subversion throughout the region. Permitting Iran to purchase U.S. arms served Cold War objectives by securing the Shah's alignment with Washington after Iran had briefly explored Soviet alternatives in the 1960s, while also benefiting the American economy. However, because of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo against the United States, oil prices became very high. This enabled the shah to buy more advanced weaponry than U.S. officials had expected, which caused concern in Washington.

Ford administration 1974–1977

Under president Gerald Ford, U.S.–Iran relations began to cool. Unlike Richard Nixon, Ford lacked a close personal relationship with the Shah, and his administration took a more cautious stance on nuclear cooperation. Negotiations over American nuclear exports to Iran faltered as Ford insisted on additional safeguards beyond those required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the Shah rejected as an infringement on Iran's sovereignty.

In 1975, President Ford approved a plan allowing Iran to process U.S. nuclear materials and purchase a plutonium reprocessing facility. Henry Kissinger later described it as a commercial deal with an ally, with no discussion of weapons concerns.

Despite continuing Nixon's arms sales policy, granting Iran wide access to U.S. weapons, Ford faced internal opposition and growing concerns in Congress. Meanwhile, U.S. officials—particularly Treasury Secretary William Simon grew increasingly critical of the Shah's role in maintaining high oil prices, during a time when surging inflation was driving the U.S. economy toward a recession. To America, the Shah's strategy of pumping oil profits into domestic investments, such as its military, indicated Iran's desire for superpower status. In 1976, the U.S. covertly supported Saudi Arabia's move to drive down oil prices, undercutting Iran's revenues.

The resulting oil price collapse in early 1977 triggered a severe financial crisis in Iran, forcing austerity measures that led to rising unemployment and social unrest. These developments significantly weakened the Shah's regime and contributed to the conditions that precipitated the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Later declassified documents suggest that key U.S. policymakers underestimated the risks of destabilizing their long-time ally.

Carter administration 1977–1981

In the late 1970s, American President Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights in his foreign policy, but went easy in private with the Shah. By 1977, Iran had garnered unfavorable publicity in the international community for its bad human rights record. That year, the Shah responded to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the Shah's regime.

Carter angered anti-Shah Iranians with a New Year's Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he said:

Under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more.

Observers disagree over the nature of United States policy toward Iran under Carter as the Shah's regime crumbled. According to historian Nikki Keddie, the Carter administration followed "no clear policy" on Iran. The U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully". At the same time, officials in the State Department believed the revolution was unstoppable. After visiting the Shah in 1978, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse. Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in assurances that the Shah would receive military support.

Sociologist Charles Kurzman argues that the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'état".

The Iranian/Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) ousted the Shah and replaced him with the anti-American Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The United States government State Department and intelligence services "consistently underestimated the magnitude and long-term implications of this unrest". Six months before the revolution culminated, the CIA had produced a report stating that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation."

Reagan administration 1981–1989

American intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in arming Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War. However, Bob Woodward states that the United States gave information to both sides, hoping "to engineer a stalemate". In search for a new set or order in this region, Washington adopted a policy designed to contain both sides economically and militarily. During the second half of the Iran–Iraq War, the Reagan administration pursued several sanction bills against Iran; on the other hand, it established full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist government in Iraq by removing it from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984. According to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, the administrations of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous dual-use items, including chemicals and biological agents, such as anthrax and bubonic plague. The Iran–Iraq War ended with both agreeing to a ceasefire in 1988.

Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shi'ite Islamist group, has carried out multiple anti-American attacks, including the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut (killing 63, including 17 Americans), the Beirut barracks bombing (killing 241 U.S. Marines), and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. U.S. courts have ruled Iran responsible for these attacks, with evidence showing Hezbollah operated under Iran's direction and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the Khobar Towers bombing.

According to the Tower Commission report:

In 1983, the U.S. helped bring to the attention of Tehran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, that virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran.

To evade congressional rules regarding an arms embargo, officials in President Ronald Reagan's administration arranged in the mid-1980s to sell arms to Iran in an attempt to improve relations and obtain their influence in the release of hostages held in Lebanon. Oliver North of the National Security Council diverted proceeds from the arms sale to fund anti-Marxist Contra rebels in Nicaragua. In November 1986, Reagan issued a statement denying the arms sales. One week later, he confirmed that weapons had been transferred to Iran, but denied that they were part of an exchange for hostages. Later investigations by Congress and an independent counsel disclosed details of both operations and noted that documents relating to the affair were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials on national security grounds. The revelation that profits from the arms sales had been illegally funneled to the Contras created a major political scandal for Reagan.

George H. W. Bush administration 1989–1993

Newly elected U.S. president George H. W. Bush announced a "goodwill begets goodwill" gesture in his inaugural speech on January 20, 1989. The Bush administration urged President of Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to use Iran's influence in Lebanon to obtain the release of the remaining U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah. Bush indicated there would be a reciprocal gesture toward Iran by the United States.

Relevant background events during the first year of Bush's administration include the ending of the Iran–Iraq War and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini believed he had a sacred duty to purge Iran of what he saw as Western corruption and moral decay, aiming to restore the country to religious purity under Islamic theocratic rule. Khomeini was succeeded by Ali Khamenei.

Clinton administration 1993–2001

In April 1995, a total oil and trade embargo on dealings with Iran by American companies was imposed by Bill Clinton. This ended trade, which had been growing following the end of the Iran–Iraq War. The next year, the American Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act, designed to prevent other countries from making large investments in Iranian energy. The act was denounced by the European CC as invalid.

In January 1998, newly elected Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States. In the interview, Khatami invoked Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to explain similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded positively. This brought free travel between the countries as well as an end to the American embargo of Persian carpets and pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and support for terrorism.

Four members of the United States Congress: Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, Representative Gary Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in New York City with several Iranian leaders in August 2000. The Iranians included Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament); Maurice Motamed, a Jewish member of the Majlis; and three other Iranian parliamentarians.

George W. Bush administration 2001–2009

Iran–United States relations during the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) were marked by heightened tensions, mutual distrust, and periodic attempts at limited engagement. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Iran initially was sympathetic with the United States.

Relations deteriorated sharply after President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002, accusing the country of pursuing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the U.S. In 2003, Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann relayed an unofficial proposal to the U.S. outlining a possible "grand bargain" with Iran. He claimed it was developed in cooperation with Iran, but it lacked formal Iranian endorsement, and the Bush administration did not pursue the offer.

Between 2003 and 2008, Iran accused the United States of repeatedly violating its territorial sovereignty through drone incursions, covert operations, and support for opposition groups. In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. During his presidency, attempts at dialogue, including a personal letter to President Bush, were dismissed by U.S. officials, while public tensions grew over Iran's nuclear program, U.S. foreign policy, and Ahmadinejad's controversial remarks at international forums. The United States intensified covert operations against Iran, including alleged support for militant groups such as PEJAK and Jundullah, cross-border activities, and expanded CIA and Special Forces missions. Iran was repeatedly accused by the U.S. of arming and training Iraqi insurgents, including Shiite militias and groups linked to Hezbollah, with American officials citing captured weapons, satellite images, and detainee testimonies. During this period, additional flashpoints included the U.S. raid on Iran's consulate in Erbil, sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, a naval dispute in the Strait of Hormuz, and the public disclosure of covert action plans against Iran.

Obama administration 2009–2017

Iran–United States relations during the Obama administration (2009–2017) were defined by a shift from confrontation to cautious engagement, culminating in the landmark nuclear agreement of 2015.

At the start of Obama's presidency, both sides exchanged public messages signaling a possible thaw, with Iran voicing long-standing grievances and the United States calling for mutual respect and responsibility. However, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election in 2009, which sparked mass protests and allegations of fraud, the United States responded with skepticism and concern. In late 2011 and early 2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and warned a U.S. aircraft carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. rejected the warning and maintained its naval presence, while experts doubted Iran's ability to sustain a blockade.

The 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, seen as a moderate, marked a shift in tone, with his outreach at the UN and a historic phone call with Obama signaling renewed diplomatic engagement. While high-level contact resumed and symbolic gestures were exchanged, conservative backlash in Iran highlighted internal divisions over rapprochement. In 2015, the United States and other world powers reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The agreement marked a major diplomatic achievement for the Obama administration, though it faced skepticism in Congress and mixed public support in the U.S.

Despite the JCPOA, tensions between the United States and Iran persisted over ballistic missile tests, continued U.S. sanctions, and European business hesitancy due to fear of U.S. penalties. The administration also faced criticism for its handling of these issues, both from Iran and from political opponents.

First Trump administration 2017–2021

Iran–United States relations during the first Trump administration (2017–2021) were marked by a sharp policy shift from Obama's engagement-oriented approach. Trump began with a travel ban affecting Iranian citizens, and withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A broader maximum pressure campaign followed, with over 1,500 sanctions targeting Iran's financial, oil, and shipping sectors, as well as foreign firms doing business with Iran, severely damaging its economy. The effort aimed to isolate Iran but met with strong resistance—even from U.S. allies—and often left Washington diplomatically isolated.

Iran responded by threatening to resume unrestricted uranium enrichment; rejecting negotiations with the Trump administration, and intensified rhetoric. Tensions escalated in 2019 with U.S. intelligence reports of Iranian threats, attacks on oil tankers, the downing of a U.S. drone by Iran, and suspected Iranian strikes on Saudi oil facilities. President Trump called off retaliatory strikes, opting for cyberattacks and additional sanctions instead.

A major escalation followed a December 2019 rocket attack on the K-1 Air Base in Iraq, which led to American airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias and a retaliatory attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. On January 3, 2020, the U.S. assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in a drone strike, prompting Iranian missile attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and heightened fears of war. The crisis deepened with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane by Iranian forces and continued through early 2020 with retaliatory strikes and threats.

Later in 2020, Iran blamed U.S. sanctions for limiting its COVID-19 response. They launched a military satellite, and were later accused of interfering in the U.S. presidential election and proxy attacks. Relations ended under Trump with continued hostility and unresolved disputes.

Biden administration 2021–2025

Iran–United States relations during the Biden administration (2021–2025) were shaped by efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement alongside ongoing regional tensions, sanctions, cyberattacks, and proxy conflicts. Early in Joe Biden's presidency, U.S. officials expressed interest in returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but negotiations in Vienna eventually stalled. Iran increased uranium enrichment and imposed retaliatory sanctions, while the U.S. imposed new sanctions over missile programs, oil exports, and human rights abuses.

Tensions persisted throughout this era, marked by recurring proxy attacks on U.S. bases, which intensified following the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023, and by subsequent American retaliatory strikes. The period also saw disputes over the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, and military escalations across the Gulf region. In 2023, a breakthrough occurred with a U.S.–Iran prisoner swap and the release of frozen Iranian funds, though indirect diplomacy remained fragile. Iran was later accused of interfering in the 2024 U.S. presidential election through cyber operations and AI disinformation. Alleged assassination plots targeting Donald Trump and dissidents on U.S. soil further strained relations. By late 2024, relations remained adversarial, marked by unresolved security disputes and growing mistrust.

Second Trump administration 2025–2026

In November 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Iran has attempted to assassinate U.S. officials and dissidents, including Trump. In February 2025, three weeks after his second inauguration, Trump said he had given the U.S. military and his advisors instructions to obliterate Iran if he were to be assassinated.

In February, Trump signed the return of the Maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian government.

Trump called for talks for a nuclear peace agreement.

In the Friday prayer of February 7, Khamenei dismissed negotiations and stated that the Iranian government should not make a deal with the U.S. February 9, Trump said that he would rather make a deal with Iranians than let them be bombed by Israel.

In March 2025, Khamenei stated that he did not intend to negotiate with Trump. IRGC General Salami threatened United States military with devastation. Trump threatened he would hold Iranian regime to blame for any shots fired by Houthis.

Putin and Trump reached an agreement that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.

In April, Ali Larijani, advisor to Khamenei, threatened Trump that Iran would make nuclear weapons. Islamic Republic military allegedly had recommended a preemptively strike on U.S. military bases.

In April, Trump stated that Iranians want direct negotiations. Iran–United States negotiations began on April 12, 2025.

In April 2025, U.S. congressmen Joe Wilson and Jimmy Panetta introduced a 'Free Iraq from Iran' bill. The legislation mandates the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to irreversibly dismantle Iran-backed militias, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and calls for the suspension of U.S. assistance to Iraq until these militias are fully removed. The bill also imposes sanctions on Iraqi political and military figures aligned with Iran, and provides support for Iraqi citizens and independent media to expose abuses committed by these militias. Its primary objective is to restore Iraq's sovereignty and reduce Iranian dominance without resorting to direct military intervention.

2026 US MoU Iranian nuclear agreement

On July 3rd President Trump declared Iran has agreed to everything and almostly all and every one of US demands.

Economic relations

Trade between Iran and the United States reached $623 million in 2008. According to the United States Census Bureau, American exports to Iran reached $93 million in 2007 and $537 million in 2008. American imports from Iran decreased from $148 million in 2007 to $86 million in 2008. This data does not include trade conducted through third countries to circumvent the trade embargo. It has been reported that the United States Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 special licenses to American companies over the past decade to conduct business with Iran.

US exports to Iran include cigarettes (US$73 million); corn (US$68 million); chemical wood pulp, soda or sulfate (US$64 million); soybeans (US$43 million); medical equipment (US$27 million); vitamins (US$18 million); and vegetable seeds (US$12 million).

In May 2013, U.S. president Barack Obama lifted a trade embargo of communications equipment and software to non-government Iranians. In June 2013, the Obama administration expanded its sanctions against Iran, targeting its auto industry and, for the first time, its currency.

According to a 2014 study by the National Iranian American Council, sanctions cost the U.S. over $175 billion in lost trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities.

According to Business Monitor International:

The tentative rapprochement between Iran and the US, which began in the second half of 2013, has the potential to become a world-changing development, and unleash tremendous geopolitical and economic opportunities, if it is sustained. Tehran and Washington have been bitter enemies since 1979, when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the pro-American Shah and replaced him with a virulently anti-American Islamist regime. Since then, Iran has been at the vanguard of countries actively challenging the US-led world order. This has led to instability in the Middle East, and Iran's relative isolation in international affairs. Yet, if Iran and the US were to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could decline sharply, and Iran could come to be perceived as a promising emerging market in its own right.

Sources of the socio-political tensions

The antagonism has been explained in part by an incompatibility of social values, the resistance to American hegemony, and its US support for Israel. In the West, however, various explanations have been considered, including the Iranian government's need for an external bogeyman to furnish a pretext for domestic repression against pro-democratic forces and to bind the government to its loyal constituency. The United States attributes the worsening of relations to the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis, Iran's repeated human rights abuses since the Islamic Revolution, different restrictions on using spy methods on democratic revolutions by the U.S., its anti-Western ideology, its nuclear program, and political, financial, and military support to armed groups committed primarily to countering the influence of U.S. and Israel in the West Asia.

Public opinion

Iranians

Research has shown that most Iranians hold a positive attitude about the American people, though not the U.S. government.

According to a 2019 survey by IranPoll, 13% of Iranians have a favorable view of the United States, with 86% expressing an unfavourable view, the most unfavorable perception of the United States in the world.

According to the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy report Iranian Public Opinion in the Early Days of the Pezeshkian Administration released in May 2025, public opinion in Iran toward the United States has shifted significantly over time. According to survey data, the perception of America as a dangerous country increased from 46% in 2005 to 66% in 2019, before slightly declining to 64% in March 2024. Conversely, views of the United States as a model country for its values and freedoms declined sharply, from 37% in 2005 to 12% in 2019 and further to 9% in 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who considered America to be no better or worse than other countries rose steadily, from 14% in 2005 to 20% in 2019 and 25% in March 2024, indicating a gradual normalization alongside persistent negative perceptions.

Americans

In NORC polling conducted in 1952 ahead of the coup d'état the following year, 35% of Americans said that it would matter a "great deal" if communists took control of Iran. Public concern about Iran was generally limited before the 1979 Iran hostage crisis. After the September 11 attacks made much of the public fearful of future acts of terrorism, concerns about Iran intensified. In 2004, 58% of Americans said that they felt that Iran posed a long-term threat to the United States. Many Americans at the time viewed Iran unfavorably and thought it posed a threat to the United States and other countries.

According to a 2018 Pew poll, 39% of Americans say that limiting the power and influence of Iran should be a top foreign policy priority.

According to a 2013 BBC World Service poll, 5% of Americans view Iranian influence positively, with 87% expressing a negative view, the most unfavorable perception of Iran in the world.

According to a 2026 Gallup poll, only 13% of Americans have favorable opinions of Iran, while 79% have an unfavorable opinion. This was the second most negative ranking Americans gave out of the 21 foreign countries surveyed.