José María Cabral

Early life and family

Little data has emerged about the first two decades of Cabral's life. He was born in Ingenio Nuevo, near San Cristóbal, on December 12, 1816. His family, which had ancient colonial backgrounds, Portuguese and Canarian, was part of the weak upper strata that remained in the country after the upheavals caused by the Treaty of Basel of 1795, which stipulated the transfer to France. The social position of his parents made it possible for young Cabral to go to England to study. He did not achieve an academic training, but instead concentrated on commercial studies. But the knowledge of the most developed country at the time penetrated his character and political conceptions. His identification with liberalism, as a current that gave support to an independent and democratic State, should not have been foreign to the English experience, the country where modern political institutions first emerged and where the first liberal thinkers met.

He was the uncle of future Dominican president Marcos Antonio Cabral.

First Republic

Preparations for war

In 1844, Cabral was 27 years old, the age at which one begins to emerge from youth and one's personality traits are finally defined. Then he was already responding to the masterful characterization of his figure that, as if he were painting him live, made by the historian Sócrates Nolasco:

It is difficult to find another liberator of America so patient to read insults against his reputation without being moved or answering them. High and dry, sober and cold […]. His temperance was admirable and his fortitude in suffering was admirable. He ate, since he lived; but in parsimony no one equaled him. He thought and spoke, since he led men; but he used to remain silent for hours and hours, finally interrupted by a brief order or specific monosyllable. At times it seemed that it was going to become a stone monument.

He was still young, but he was ready to enter fully into the historical scene that was being inaugurated. Like so many others, he set out to contribute to the consolidation of Dominican independence. The great problem to overcome at that time was to crush the attempts of the Haitian government to annul independence and roll back the occupation that had begun since February 1822. Consequently, the race for arms was the order of the day for those who wanted to help the homeland. In accordance with his vocation, Cabral enlisted in the Dominican Army, taking part in the Battle of Azua. His warrior skills earned him promotions; In 1845 he was promoted to colonel and became part of the General Staff of General Antonio Duvergé, under whose responsibility was the defense of the Dominican territory, and therefore took part in all the important military actions that occurred in those first years of independent life on the southern border.

Friendly relations were established between Duvergé and Cabral, which must have contributed to completing our hero's military training. It must be taken into consideration that Duvergé was the number one strategist of the Dominican army. He had to systematize military action based on assault with edged weapons, in order to compensate for the inferiority in numbers and modern weapons. Duvergé's military doctrine was inspired by a long-standing memory that came from the 17th century, when the natives of the country, grouped in militias, successfully opposed the attacks of the buccaneers. Cabral was not actually a professional military man, since at that time the army was not a permanent institution, but was made up of recruits called up due to the aggressive plans of the Haitian rulers. When the danger ceased, everyone went home to take care of their usual affairs. And this was precisely what Cabral did, whose liberal ideas were not to the liking of conservative President Pedro Santana. Now, his military skills were beginning to be recognized, so Santana promoted him to general in 1855.

Dominican War of Independence

During the first three campaigns of the Dominican War of Independence, between 1844 and 1849, Cabral participated as a second-rate officer, he covered himself with glory in the fourth campaign, between December 1855 and January of the following year. He had been appointed one of the leaders of the southern border when it was learned that the emperor of Haiti, Faustin Soulouque, was preparing to invade the country for the second time. After the start of the Haitian offensive, Santana did not want to give command of the troops to Cabral, despite the knowledge he had of the area, possibly because he did not inspire political confidence. The 12,000 men of the Haitian army advanced rapidly and the Dominicans had to retreat. The troops that regrouped in San Juan de la Maguana, composed of about 3,000 troops, were commanded by General Juan Contreras, a personal friend of Santana. Cabral was assigned leadership of the right wing. Santana threatened terrible punishments if the Haitians' horses drank water from the San Juan River. The combat took place in the Sabana de Santomé, a short distance from San Juan de la Maguana. General Contreras lost track of the entire battle. This caused a part of the troops on the left wing to believe that the Haitians had won, beginning the retreat. Given the vacuum created, Cabral assumed command and managed to inflict a devastating defeat on the Haitian army, leaving hundreds dead on the ground.

For the first time, Cabral exhibited his exceptional military skills. He represented an example of a military leader different from that of Santana, who always kept his distance from the theater of operations. In the Battle of Santomé, the figure of Cabral began to acquire legendary overtones. His subordinates were amazed to see him fighting like a beast in the first line of fire. In the midst of the heat of combat, another of his personality traits emerged: humanity. When the general in chief of the Haitian troops, Antoine Pierrot, Duke of Tiburon, saw that defeat was imminent, he preferred to lose his life and rushed almost alone against the Dominican lines. Cabral gauged his enemy's intention and set out to save his life, revealing a respectable sense of honor. But he arrived late to the duke, who was killed by a Dominican's machete.

Over time, a legend circulated, contrary to the facts, according to which the Dominican general severed the head of the Haitian duke in a hand-to-hand duel. Santomé's victory stopped Soulouque's plans in their tracks and ratified the ability of the Dominicans to maintain independence thanks to their own forces. It also ended up evidencing the incapacity of the Haitian army, despite its numerical and weapons advantage. Cabral was covered in glory, as one of the signature personifications of the country, which was recognized by Congress after Santana resigned from the presidency.

Cibaeño Revolution

Since the struggle for power between Santana and Buenaventura Báez began in 1848, after the latter's first administration concluded, Cabral took his side, although initially discreetly. When Báez returned to the presidency in mid-1857, he found in Cabral one of his few supporters with military merits. The new president entrusted Cabral with the symbolic mission of heading to El Seibo to bring Santana prisoner and deport him. As historians such as Sócrates Nolasco and Rufino Martínez have explained, Baecism at that time constituted an amalgamation of sectors that for various reasons repudiated Santana's despotism. Among them, young people from the city of Santo Domingo with liberal leanings stood out.

Due to the civil war of 1857 and 1858, when the leading sectors of Santiago questioned Báez's actions, Cabral held the main military responsibility for Baecism, as commander of the province of Santo Domingo. He directly confronted Santana, to whom the Cibaeños ceded leadership of the siege over the centuries-old walled city. Despite the enthusiasm of the young people of the capital, their cause was lost, since they were opposed by the rest of the country.

Annexation period

Early resistance

Báez had to abandon power in mid-1858 and Santana ignored the government of Santiago the liberal constitution promulgated in Moca months before. Cabral left the country with the fallen president and his collaborators. But, like so many Baecistas of that time, he remained with the former president to the extent that he represented the opposition to Santana. On the occasion of Santana's plans to annex the Dominican Republic to Spain, Cabral's national and democratic position was strengthened, in contrast to Báez's ambiguity. He withdrew towards Europe, leaving his supporters free to oppose Santana's plans, but in the end he sought the position of field marshal of the Spanish army in the hope of replacing Santana as the dominators' favorite. Faced with such action, some friends of Báez united under the leadership of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, who defined the reasons for the opposition to the annexation and proposed to conclude an alliance with the Haitian government of Fabré Geffrard to fight against it.

After Sánchez released his glorious manifesto on 20 January 1861, Cabral himself issued his own manifesto. Just like Sánchez, he denounced Santana as a traitor and attacked the Spanish regime, which still held authority in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He would go on to call the Dominican people to arms, highlighting the importance of the many revolutionary struggles of freedom that shook North America. His manifesto stated:

Saint Thomas, March 30, 1861

DOMINICANS!

Eighty-five years ago the first cry of freedom and independence resounded in virgin America. This sublime cry raised by the firstborn of the republics, the homeland of Washington, was welcomed by the most advanced of nations in modern civilization. Noble France lent North America its treasures, its ships, the prestige of its approval and even its heroes.

Shortly after, a prodigy was seen that has lately been appreciated at its fair value, the sublime genius of Victor Hugo and Lamartine. The world saw, astonished, the scream that the oppressed classes raised in the western part of the island of Santo Domingo turned into harangues and cheers for freedom, and the descendants of Africa formed a republic that remains today on the path of civilization and progress.

Dominican Restoration War

After the Dominican Restoration War began, in August 1863, Cabral was deported abroad, suspected of sympathizing with the rebels. When he set foot on homeland again, in June 1864, the Spanish troops had been deploying an offensive in the south for some time. To respond to this advance, the then chief restaurateur in the region, Pedro Florentino, had responded with the application of terror measures against the Spaniards, which did not prevent chaos from spreading in the national ranks. Adverse circumstances prevailed, such as the influence that the Mocano Juan de Jesús Salcedo had in the region, who acted in the style of a bandit leader. General Manuel María Castillo, perhaps because he was not a native of the region, could not print unity to the resistance against the annexationist General Eusebio Puello. After failed attempts to straighten things out in the south, the Restoration Government of Santiago entrusted the leadership of that front to Cabral, counting on his knowledge of the area and his gift of command. From the first days in the leadership, the inferiority in which the Dominicans found themselves in the south began to be reversed. Cabral managed to remove Juan de Jesús Salcedo and other leaders who were involved in looting scenes from circulation, and gave assurances to those who had sought the protection of the Spanish out of fear. He imposed order on military formations and prepared the conditions for the counteroffensive.

The opportunity to consolidate the recovery of the national cause arose in the Battle of La Canela, on December 4, 1864, when the troops led by Cabral defeated those of General Eusebio Puello. The Dominicans ambushed the enemy and caused a large number of casualties, with those who were saved fleeing. From then on the pace of operations entered an ascending phase, and Cabral proceeded to advance over almost the entire territory, with the exception of the cities near the coast and its surroundings. Since the beginning of 1865, the city of Santo Domingo was almost under siege, since the restoration guerrillas dominated the territory that separated it from San Cristóbal. Cabral became the champion of the Restoration in the south and obtained the support of almost all the generals, who saw him as the guarantor of victory. The war in the region took an autonomous course from that dictated by the Santiago government. Since the Spanish troops abandoned the country, on July 11, 1865, a regionalist feeling emerged among the southern generals, who considered that it was no longer valid for the capital of the Republic to continue in Santiago, as was the intention of the Cibaeño president Pedro Antonio Pimentel. He understood the weak position he was in and decided to move to Santo Domingo; But along the way he was surprised by a pronouncement by generals led by Eusebio Manzueta who proceeded to overthrow him. On August 4, 1865, Cabral was proclaimed protector, a title with which he was elevated to the presidency of the Dominican Republic.

Post-restoration War

First presidency

Cabral's first administration was known as the Protectorate. According to the historian Roberto Cassá, the new government faced regionalist divisions and the challenge of national unity following two years of war that had left the country economically devastated, and early hopes for rapid recovery were constrained by the country's economic and cultural conditions.

Covered with enormous prestige, the protector set out to reconcile all Dominicans, so he offered positions in the government train to prepared people who had collaborated with the Spanish authorities, regardless of whether they had been followers of Santana or Báez. He aspired to the establishment of a democratic regime, subject to the government of the most capable, since he was convinced that the mission of governing was reserved for those endowed with an adequate cultural level. It can be inferred that, imbued with patriotism and genuine selflessness, he considered his mission as president from the angle of the man at arms called to guarantee the correct exercise of power by the capable. The truth is that the title of protector that the southern generals gave him was tailored to their intentions.

Following this logic, and in line with his modesty, he adopted a low profile as president, delegating a large part of his powers to Juan Ramón Fiallo, a lawyer he trusted, who advocated a moderate orientation aimed at attracting the support of conservative sectors. Cabral was identified with Fiallo's conception, as he believed that it was imperative to unify the thinking sectors in the government and that their execution should guarantee the correct functioning of the institutions and economic activity, which in the first place meant offering guarantees to the merchant exporters and importers from the ports, almost all foreigners, who dominated the country's economy.

But his government, despite the favorable reception from the higher sectors, could not do anything in a country suffering from tremendous difficulties, in the first place because it enjoyed less than three months of stability. In October 1865, the leader Pedro Guillermo, one of the leaders of the Restoration in the east, raised the banner of rebellion and dragged other strong men in the demand that Buenaventura Báez be brought to the presidency. Like so many other local leaders of the Restoration, Guillermo had been a supporter of Báez until 1861, and he did not find it contradictory to his fidelity to the leader that he had taken the oath to the Spanish flag while he was taking part in the national war. Cabral tried to resist, seeking support from reserve units around Santo Domingo; but when Pedro Guillermo appeared threatening on the other side of the Ozama, he chose to seek a negotiated solution to the situation. He decided to comply with the demand of the rebellious leaders, for which he attested to his former sympathy for Báez and offered to go look for him in his exile in Curacao in order to hand over the presidency to him.

Second presidency

Cabral left the country prepared to promote an insurrectional movement. On April 26, 1866, he published a manifesto in Curacao that constituted a memorial of grievances against Báez. He accused him of having illegally occupied office through violence, exercising power arbitrarily and without subjection to the law, ignoring the liberal constitution and having supplanted it with that of 1854 that enshrined despotism, as well as filling the prisons with opponents, put pressure on congressmen, allow excesses and exactions, compromise the country's credit through a large debt abroad and waste budget resources.

With these arguments in hand and having obtained the support of Andrés Ogando and other generals who had been his subordinates during the Restoration, Cabral crossed the border. The uprising in the south was followed by a demonstration in Puerto Plata that brought Luperón from his exile in the Turks and Caicos Islands. Báez did not have the strength to stop the advance of Cabral and Luperón's men. He sent Pimentel, Minister of the Interior, to confront the uprising in Cibao, but the former president joined the rebels, his colleagues from the Restoration. Báez abdicated and a Triumvirate composed of Gregorio Luperón, Pedro A. Pimentel and Federico de Jesús García took over the government. In accordance with the conception of Luperón and Pimentel, their sole objective was to call elections for the designation of a definitive government. Cabral was selected as the candidate of liberal circles, who were already beginning to recognize themselves by the color blue, as opposed to the red of Báez's supporters. Luperón did not aspire to the presidency, Pimentel had not recovered from the discredit in which he was plunged at the end of the war and Cabral continued to be the leader who enjoyed the greatest recognition in the influential circles of the capital. On August 22, 1866, he was sworn in again as president of the Republic.

In this second government, Cabral once again entrusted the affairs of the government to Juan Ramón Fiallo, who placed the former Santanistas in the leading positions of the public administration, determined to erase the divisions that the national war had left and encouraged by the consideration that They had to be won as allies to confront Báez's prestige among leaders and peasants. Perhaps for this reason, since then some have interpreted that the blues were the same old followers of Santana, always determined to oppose Báez, a false conclusion since it ignored the emergence of an ideological current inspired by the ideals of the Restoration, which sought to give rise to a formal entity carrying liberal principles, which was called the National Party. What happened was that, to maintain validity and oppose Báez, the Santanistas decided to ally themselves with the liberals and they accepted them.

Six Years' War

Clashes with Báez

With the entry into Santo Domingo of General Manuel A. Cáceres, on January 31, 1868, the so-called Six Years Government began, one of the most tragic periods in 19th-century history. Cabral and his supporters left the country for Venezuela and then spread between Puerto Rico, Curaçao and Saint Thomas. Some ventured to head towards Haiti, despite the presidency of Sylvain Salnave, to whom the Reds largely owed their victory. Despite the danger he could run and taking advantage of the presence of some of his supporters, Cabral spent several weeks in Haiti in mid-1868, taking steps to prepare for war against the Reds. The Haitian liberals, led by Nissage Saget, occupied the city of Jacmel, in the south of the country, and cooperation agreements were renewed between the liberals of both countries on the island. The blue volunteers played an important role in several defeats of Salnave's supporters. When the opportune moment arrived, after signing a unity pact with the other blue chiefs in the Haitian city of Saint Marc and while the civil war was developing in the interior of Haiti, Cabral got Saget's men to clear the way for him to the border, accompanied by few followers.

Returning to Dominican territory in March 1869, he once again took refuge under the protection of General Andrés Ogando, the main leader in the southwestern confines, where Báez had not managed to consolidate his presence. Cabral quickly obtained the support of other generals in the region and formed a considerable troop that was in a position to dispute the land with the government. Many of his supporters, who were in Haiti and other nearby countries, rushed to join him, ready to fight the inveterate Red enemies.

But the blues were in a disadvantageous situation. His rearguard in Haiti was insecure, since Saget's party still did not control the territory of that country in its entirety; At the same time, the Reds had unleashed a horrific escalation of terror. As the blue guerrillas spread, the government responded by creating flying gangs of outlaws that spread panic in the populations that were under the rule of the insurgents. The most famous leaders of these groups, Carlos Justo de Vargas and Aniceto Chanlatte, known by the nicknames Baúl and Solito, confessed years later, in a judicial process, that they had murdered 143 people, (94 people, respectively, with their hands). Additionally, Báez enjoyed an extraordinary charisma among the population, while the blues did not have any figure that unified them, victims of the disputes for hegemony between Cabral, Luperón and Pimentel, as well as, to a lesser extent, between some prestigious intellectuals. who supported them from exile. None of the three supreme chiefs was endowed with Báez's ability or surrounded by his aura of popularity. However, the blues were able to consolidate their extensive bastion beyond the Yaque del Sur River, because they represented the ascending sense of history, which tended to consolidate the national order, despite all the obstacles that arose.

Salnave's offer

In February 1870, after Cabral had been directing the guerrilla resistance for nearly a year, the Haitian president Sylvain Salnave was overthrown and, leading 1,500 men, abandoned Port-au-Prince with the intention of escaping the besiegers of the city. Suffering several defeats along the way, Salnave was forced to enter the Dominican Republic with a view to benefiting from the protection of Báez. But he had to enter the area dominated by the blues. Since he learned of Salnave's arrival on Dominican soil, Cabral put all his troops on alert, fearing that the Baecistas would attempt a simultaneous attack from Azua. Furthermore, it was a matter of principle for him to prevent Haitian fugitives from crossing his territory armed. Cabral agreed to enter into negotiations with a delegation that Salnave offered to send.

When he saw that he made a countermarch and did not keep his promise, he prepared to attack him. He sent a small detachment, under the command of Colonel Bartolo Batista, who engaged in combat and had to retreat due to the superiority of Salnave's troops. Cabral then dispatched General Vidal Guitó with 150 men. The former Haitian president tried to mislead the blues and sent requests to Valentín Ramírez Báez to attack from Azua, which was carried out, although without results. On January 10, 1870, a bloody clash broke out between Dominican blues and Haitian Salnavistas in the area of La Cuaba, in the heart of the Bahoruco mountain range, near Polo. After several hours of combat, with heavy casualties on both sides, including General Guitó and women and children relatives of Salnave's entourage, he surrendered.

The newly installed government in the Haitian capital, chaired by Saget, an ally of Cabral, requested that Salnave be sent to him along with his companions, since they were accused of committing political crimes. In a desperate attempt to save himself, Alfred Delva, Salvane's former minister, offered Cabral a large sum of money in exchange for not handing them over. He reasoned that, with that sum, it would be easy for him to supply his troops to overthrow Báez. The former minister did not take into account the moral character of Cabral, who was outraged by such audacity. He decided to delegate the delicate matter that represented the fate of Salnave to a council of generals, in which he limited himself to serving as president. It was resolved, apparently unanimously, that Salnave and his assistants be handed over to the Haitian Government.

This decision immediately acquired highly controversial overtones, as Salnave and some of his comrades were shot by the Haitian authorities. Political leaders of the time and later historians have estimated that, with that decision, Cabral tarnished his personal history, because he did not observe the rule of neutrality in his territory. Even Luperón censures the decision in his memoirs, claiming that he made his protest public at that moment. It has been alleged that the Blues received a large sum of money from the Haitian government as a reward, and there are those who have dared to insinuate that Cabral benefited from the operation.

Conclusion of the war

The war continued with the characteristic ups and downs, although in an ascending phase for the blues until 1871, thanks to the legitimacy of the objective of preventing annexation to the United States. When the patriot generals considered that they had consolidated their dominance over the extreme southwest, they decided to form a government with the title of Provisional Government of the Revolution, headed by Cabral as president of the Dominican Republic. The acts and arguments of this unique guerrilla government would be collected in a newspaper published in Haiti, which ended up with the name Dominican Pavilion. The Cabral government claimed to have control over the territory and tried to put together administrative devices.

In those very difficult circumstances, Cabral was concerned about guaranteeing individual safety and property; To prevent degeneration into banditry, any act of plunder was punishable by the death penalty. Despite all the triumphs, the conditions were not conducive to the functioning of the Provisional Government, and in December 1871 the ministers Alejandro Román and Mariano Antonio Cestero decided to abandon their positions without even presenting their resignation. There was a reorganization of the government into commissions for the Interior, Justice and Foreign Relations, Finance and Commerce, and War and Navy; As their directors were the main military leaders and intellectuals who accompanied Cabral, almost all of them generals, such as Andrés Ogando, Francisco Moreno, Manuel Rodríguez Objío, Manuel María Castillo, Tomás Ramón Castillo, Francisco Gregorio Billini and Timoteo Ogando.

After the failure of successive campaigns, Báez decided to personally lead a march in order to crush the guerrillas. He made a levy of nearly 10,000 men and he himself assumed the direction of the main body that fell on San Juan and Las Matas. Other bodies were in charge of his main lieutenants, such as Vice President, Manuel Altagracia Cáceres. Although the blues were not annihilated, the insurrection entered a phase of weakening, until it became something that stopped worrying the red hierarchs. This evolution is attributed by Nolasco to the murder of Andrés Ogando, while he was sleeping in Cambronal, at the hands of a party of government macheteros led by Baúl, who had managed to infiltrate behind the blue lines.

In 1873, Báez's focus shifted to resolving the growing conflicts he was confronting with his own followers. Perhaps the blues lost some legitimacy, after the annexation project had been rejected by the United States Senate in 1871. The cessation of the prospect of an annexation made Báez's fall a matter of time. There was a last respite due to the lease of Samaná for 150,000 dollars to a company supported by Fabens and Cazneau, the Samana Bay Company of Santo Domingo, in accordance with the same clauses of the instrument that for this purpose had been previously signed with the government of the United States.

Final years

Once the Six Years' government fell, Cabral became outdated as a politician, as José Gabriel García rightly perceived in a letter. His contribution to the national cause was strictly military, and the danger of an annexation project had already disappeared. Under these conditions, Cabral stripped himself of all party spirit, responding to the clamor of the thinking groups that demanded an end to civil strife. He considered that his contribution should become that of a moderating entity, with the express purpose of contributing to peace. He showed his detachment and offered support to the government of Ignacio María González, being appointed by this Minister of War and Navy in 1875. But Luperón, the other blue man, thought very differently; Although he did not aspire to occupy the presidency, he did intend for power to pass into the hands of the liberal sector. For this reason, Luperón came into conflict with President González and supported the civic movement that led to his overthrow in 1876.

That same year, still under the presidency of Ulises Francisco Espaillat, Cabral, identified, accepted the position of Agricultural Inspector of the province of Azua. But, unlike Luperón, he had distanced himself from his own party. That led him to support Buenaventura Báez in his fifth and last administration, which began in 1877, when the tyrant of the Six Years declared himself a democrat. Cabral did not act alone in approaching his former boss, since, for the sake of peace, several of the prominent intellectuals of Santo Domingo, such as: Emiliano Tejera, José Gabriel García and Mariano Cestero, offered their assistance to the last Báez government.

These positions expressed a reduction in the conceptual differences that until recently had mortally confronted the two currents of blue liberals and red conservatives. Now, Luperón continued to refuse to accept these positions, and it was up to him to maintain the identity of the blues. He was endowed with a more developed political sense than Cabral. And, although he did not have popularity, he became the sole leader of the liberals and prepared the ground for the seizure of power in 1879. As is known, in the following years, the blues implemented a kind of dictatorship, since, in The events prevented the electoral competition of the other political bands, which entered into a marked decline. It was under the aegis of Luperón that an integrated liberal conglomerate was formed, although a political party in the modern sense did not emerge then either.

Thus, the seizure of power by the blues, in 1879, meant that Cabral, its main founder, was removed from public affairs. After this, he spent long periods in San Juan de la Maguana. The house that Cabral built in that city is still standing, an eloquent example of the poverty in which he lived. He had the satisfaction of having contributed to the good of the country as much as possible, without pursuing wealth, power or glory. For this reason, he enjoyed the admiration of all those around him, who saw in him a living symbol of freedom.