proximity fuze

Background

Before the invention of the proximity fuze, detonation was induced by direct contact, a timer set at launch, or an altimeter. All of these earlier methods have disadvantages. The probability of a direct hit on a small moving target is low; a shell that just misses the target will not explode. A time- or height-triggered fuze requires good prediction by the gunner and accurate timing by the fuze. If either is wrong, then even accurately aimed shells may explode harmlessly before reaching the target or after passing it. At the start of the Blitz, it was estimated that it took 20,000 rounds to shoot down a single aircraft; other estimates put the figure as high as 100,000 or as low as 2,500. With a proximity fuze, the shell or missile need only pass close by the target at some time during its flight. The proximity fuze makes the problem simpler than the previous methods.

Proximity fuzes are also useful for producing air bursts against ground targets. A contact fuze would explode when it hit the ground; it would not be very effective at scattering shrapnel. A timer fuze can be set to explode a few meters above the ground but the timing is vital and usually requires observers to provide information for adjusting the timing. Observers may not be practical in many situations, the ground may be uneven, and the practice is slow in any event. Proximity fuzes fitted to such weapons as artillery and mortar shells solve this problem by having a range of set burst heights [e.g. 2, 4 or 10 m (7, 13 or 33 ft)] above ground that are selected by gun crews. The shell bursts at the appropriate height above ground.

World War II

The idea of a proximity fuze had long been considered militarily useful. Several ideas had been considered, including optical systems that shone a light, sometimes infrared, and triggered when the reflection reached a certain threshold, various ground-triggered means using radio signals, and capacitive or inductive methods similar to a metal detector. All of these suffered from the large size of pre-WWII electronics and their fragility, as well as the complexity of the required circuitry.

British military researchers Samuel Curran, William Butement, Edward Shire, and Amherst Thomson at the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) conceived of the idea of a proximity fuze in the early stages of World War II. Their system involved a small, short range, Doppler radar. British tests were then carried out with "unrotated projectiles" (the contemporary British term for unguided rockets). However, British scientists were uncertain whether a fuze could be developed for anti-aircraft shells, which had to withstand much higher accelerations than rockets. The British shared a wide range of possible ideas for designing a fuze, including a photoelectric fuze and a radio fuze, with the United States during the Tizard Mission in 1940. To work in shells, a fuze needed to be miniaturized, survive the high acceleration of cannon launch, and be reliable.

The National Defense Research Committee assigned the task to the physicist Merle Tuve at the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism. Also eventually pulled in were researchers from the National Bureau of Standards (this research unit of NBS later became part of the Army Research Laboratory). Work was split in 1942, with Tuve's group working on proximity fuzes for shells, while the National Bureau of Standards researchers focused on the technically easier task of bombs and rockets. Work on the radio shell fuze was completed by Tuve's group, known as Section T, at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (APL). Over 100 American companies were mobilized to build some 20 million shell fuzes.

The proximity fuze was one of the most important technological innovations of World War II. It was so important that it was a secret guarded to a similar level as the atom bomb project or D-Day invasion. Admiral Lewis Strauss wrote that, One of the most original and effective military developments in World War II was the proximity, or 'VT', fuze. It found use in both the Army and the Navy, and was employed in the defense of London. While no one invention won the war, the proximity fuze must be listed among the very small group of developments, such as radar, upon which victory very largely depended.

Design in the UK

The first reference to the concept of radar in the United Kingdom was made by W. A. S. Butement and P. E. Pollard, who constructed a small breadboard model of a pulsed radar in 1931. They suggested the system would be useful for coast artillery units to accurately measure the range to shipping even at night. The War Office was not interested in the concept, and told the two to work on other issues.

In 1936, the Air Ministry took over Bawdsey Manor in Suffolk to further develop their prototype radar systems that emerged the next year as Chain Home. The Army was suddenly extremely interested in the topic of radar, and sent Butement and Pollard to Bawdsey to form what became known as the "Army Cell". Their first project was a revival of their original work on coast defence, but they were soon told to start a second project to develop a range-only radar to aid anti-aircraft guns.

As these projects moved from development into prototype form in the late 1930s, Butement turned his attention to other concepts, and among these was the idea of a proximity fuze:

...Into this stepped W. A. S. Butement, designer of radar sets CD/CHL and GL, with a proposal on 30 October 1939 for two kinds of radio fuze: (1) a radar set would track the projectile, and the operator would transmit a signal to a radio receiver in the fuze when the range, the difficult quantity for the gunners to determine, was the same as that of the target and (2) a fuze would emit high-frequency radio waves that would interact with the target and produce, as a consequence of the high relative speed of target and projectile, a Doppler-frequency signal sensed in the oscillator.

In May 1940, a formal proposal from Butement, Edward Shire, and Amherst Thomson was sent to the British Air Defence Establishment based on the second of the two concepts. A breadboard circuit was constructed, and the concept was tested in the laboratory by moving a sheet of tin at various distances. Early field testing connected the circuit to a thyratron trigger operating a tower-mounted camera which photographed passing aircraft to determine distance of fuze function.

Prototype fuzes were then constructed in June 1940, and installed in "unrotated projectiles", the British cover name for solid-fueled rockets, and fired at targets supported by balloons. Rockets have relatively low acceleration and no spin creating centrifugal force, so the stresses on the delicate electronic fuze are relatively benign. It was understood that the limited application was not ideal; a proximity fuze would be useful on all types of artillery and especially anti-aircraft artillery, but those had very high accelerations.

Development in the US

Prior to and following receipt of circuitry designs from the British, various experiments were carried out by Richard B. Roberts, Henry H. Porter, and Robert B. Brode under the direction of NDRC Section T Chairman Merle Tuve. Tuve's group was known as Section T, which was located at APL throughout the war. As Tuve later put it in an interview: "We heard some rumors of circuits they were using in the rockets over in England, then they gave us the circuits, but I had already articulated the thing into the rockets, the bombs and shell." As Tuve understood, the circuitry of the fuze was rudimentary. In his words, "The one outstanding characteristic in this situation is the fact that success of this type of fuze is not dependent on a basic technical idea – all of the ideas are simple and well known everywhere." The critical work of adapting the fuze for anti-aircraft shells was done in the United States, not in England. Tuve said that despite being pleased by the outcome of the Butement et al. vs. Varian patent suit, which affirmed that the fuze was a UK invention and thereby saved the U.S. Navy millions of dollars by waiving royalty fees, the fuze design delivered by the Tizard Mission was "not the one we made to work!".

A key improvement was introduced by Lloyd Berkner, who developed a system using separate transmitter and receiver circuits. In December 1940, Tuve invited Harry Diamond and Wilbur S. Hinman, Jr, of the United States National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to investigate Berkner's improved fuze and develop a proximity fuze for rockets and bombs to use against German Luftwaffe aircraft.

In just two days, Diamond was able to come up with a new fuze design and managed to demonstrate its feasibility through extensive testing at the Naval Proving Ground at Dahlgren, Virginia. On 6 May 1941, the NBS team built six fuzes which were placed in air-dropped bombs and successfully tested over water.

Given their previous work on radio and radiosondes at NBS, Diamond and Hinman developed the proximity fuze which employed the Doppler effect of reflected radio waves. The use of the Doppler effect developed by this group was later incorporated in all radio proximity fuzes for bomb, rocket, and mortar applications. Later, the Ordnance Development Division of the National Bureau of Standards (which became the Harry Diamond Laboratories – and later merged into the Army Research Laboratory – in honor of its former chief in subsequent years) developed the first automated production techniques for manufacturing radio proximity fuzes at low cost. Filipino-American physicist Emma Unson Rotor contributed research at NBS towards this refinement of the radio proximity fuze and was one of the only women on the project.

Development

The anti-aircraft artillery range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico was used as one of the test facilities for the proximity fuze, where almost 50,000 test firings were conducted from 1942 to 1945. Testing also occurred at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, where about 15,000 bombs were dropped. Other locations include Ft. Fisher in North Carolina and Blossom Point, Maryland.

US Navy development and early production was outsourced to the Wurlitzer company, at their barrel organ factory in North Tonawanda, New York.

Production

First large scale production of tubes for the new fuzes was at a General Electric plant in Cleveland, Ohio formerly used for manufacture of Christmas-tree lamps. Fuze assembly was completed at General Electric plants in Schenectady, New York and Bridgeport, Connecticut. Once inspections of the finished product were complete, a sample of the fuzes produced from each lot was shipped to the National Bureau of Standards, where they were subjected to a series of rigorous tests at the specially built Control Testing Laboratory. These tests included low- and high-temperature tests, humidity tests, and sudden jolt tests.

By 1944, a large proportion of the American electronics industry concentrated on making the fuzes. Procurement contracts increased from US$60 million in 1942, to $200 million in 1943, to $300 million in 1944 and were topped by $450 million in 1945. As volume increased, efficiency came into play and the cost per fuze fell from $732 in 1942 to $18 in 1945. This permitted the purchase of over 22 million fuzes for approximately one billion dollars ($14.6 billion in 2021 USD). The main suppliers were Crosley, RCA, Eastman Kodak, McQuay-Norris and Sylvania. There were also over two thousand suppliers and subsuppliers, ranging from powder manufacturers to machine shops. It was among the first mass-production applications of printed circuits.

Deployment

Vannevar Bush, head of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during the war, credited the proximity fuze with three significant effects.

It was important in defense from Japanese kamikaze attacks in the Pacific. Bush estimated a sevenfold increase in the effectiveness of 5-inch anti-aircraft artillery with this innovation.

It was an important part of the radar-controlled anti-aircraft batteries that finally neutralized the German V-1 attacks on England.

It was used in Europe starting in the Battle of the Bulge where it was very effective in artillery shells fired against German infantry formations, and changed the tactics of land warfare.

At first the fuzes were only used in situations where they could not be captured by the Germans. They were used in land-based artillery in the South Pacific in 1944. Also in 1944, fuzes were allocated to the British Army's Anti-Aircraft Command, that was engaged in defending Britain against the V-1 flying bomb. As most of the British heavy anti-aircraft guns were deployed in a long, thin coastal strip (leaving inland free for fighter interceptors), dud shells fell into the sea, safely out of reach of capture. Over the course of the German V-1 campaign, the proportion of flying bombs that were destroyed flying through the coastal gun belt rose from 17% to 74%, reaching 82% during one day. A minor problem encountered by the British was that the fuze was sensitive enough to detonate the shell if it passed too close to a seabird and a number of seabird "kills" were recorded.

The Pentagon refused to allow the Allied field artillery use of the fuzes in 1944, although the United States Navy fired proximity-fuzed anti-aircraft shells in the July 1943 Battle of Gela during the invasion of Sicily. After General Dwight D. Eisenhower demanded he be allowed to use the fuzes, 200,000 shells with VT fuzes (code named "POZIT") were used in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. They made the Allied heavy artillery far more devastating, as all the shells now exploded just before hitting the ground. German divisions were caught out in the open as they had felt safe from timed fire because it was thought that the bad weather would prevent accurate observation. U.S. General George S. Patton credited the introduction of proximity fuzes with saving Liège and stated that their use required a revision of the tactics of land warfare.

Sensor types

Radio

Radio frequency sensing (radar) is the main sensing principle for artillery shells.

The device described in World War II patent works as follows: The shell contains a micro-transmitter which uses the shell body as an antenna and emits a continuous wave of roughly 180–220 MHz. As the shell approaches a reflecting object, an interference pattern is created. This pattern changes with shrinking distance: every half wavelength in distance (a half wavelength at this frequency is about 0.7 meters), the transmitter is in or out of resonance. This causes a small cycling of the radiated power and consequently the oscillator supply current of about 200–800 Hz, the Doppler frequency. This signal is sent through a band-pass filter, amplified, and triggers the detonation when it exceeds a given amplitude.

Optical

Optical sensing was developed in 1935, and patented in the United Kingdom in 1936, by a Swedish inventor, probably Edward W. Brandt, using a petoscope. It was first tested as a part of a detonation device for bombs that were to be dropped over bomber aircraft, part of the UK's Air Ministry's "bombs on bombers" concept. It was considered (and later patented by Brandt) for use with anti-aircraft missiles fired from the ground. It used then a toroidal lens, that concentrated all light from a plane perpendicular to the missile's main axis onto a photocell. When the cell current changed a certain amount in a certain time interval, the detonation was triggered.

Some modern air-to-air missiles (e.g., the ASRAAM and R-77) use lasers to trigger detonation. They project narrow beams of laser light perpendicular to the flight of the missile. As the missile cruises towards its target the laser energy simply beams out into space. As the missile passes its target some of the energy strikes the target and is reflected to the missile, where detectors sense it and detonate the warhead.

Acoustic

Acoustic proximity fuzes are actuated by the acoustic emissions from a target (example an aircraft's engine or ship's propeller). Actuation can be either through an electronic circuit coupled to a microphone, or hydrophone, or mechanically using a resonating vibratory reed connected to diaphragm tone filter.

During WW2, the Germans had at least five acoustic fuzes for anti-aircraft use under development, though none saw operational service. The most developmentally advanced of the German acoustic fuze designs was the Rheinmetall-Borsig Kranich (German for Crane) which was a mechanical device utilizing a diaphragm tone filter sensitive to frequencies between 140 and 500 Hz connected to a resonating vibratory reed switch used to fire an electrical igniter. The Schmetterling, Enzian, Rheintochter and X4 guided missiles were all designed for use with the Kranich acoustic proximity fuze.

During WW2, the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) investigated the use of acoustic proximity fuzes for anti-aircraft weapons but concluded that there were more promising technological approaches. The NDRC research highlighted the speed of sound as a major limitation in the design and use of acoustic fuzes, particularly in relation to missiles and high-speed aircraft.

Hydroacoustic influence is widely used as a detonation mechanism for naval mines and torpedoes. A ship's propeller rotating in water produces a powerful hydroacoustic noise which can be picked up using a hydrophone and used for homing and detonation. Influence firing mechanisms often use a combination of acoustic and magnetic induction receivers.

Magnetic

Magnetic sensing can only be applied to detect huge masses of iron such as ships. It is used in mines and torpedoes. Fuzes of this type can be defeated by degaussing, using non-metal hulls for ships (especially minesweepers) or by magnetic induction loops fitted to aircraft or towed buoys.

Pressure

Some naval mines use pressure fuzes which are able to detect the pressure wave of a ship passing overhead. Pressure sensors are usually used in combination with other fuze detonation technologies such as acoustic and magnetic induction.

During WW2, pressure activated fuzes were developed for sticks (or trains) of bombs to create above ground airbursts. The first bomb in the stick was fitted with an impact fuze while the other bombs were fitted with pressure sensitive diaphragm actuated detonators. The blast from the first bomb was used to trigger the fuze of the second bomb which would explode above ground and in this turn would detonate the third bomb with the process repeated all the way till the last bomb in the string. Due to the forward speed of the bomber, bombs fitted with pressure detonators would all explode at about the same height above ground along a horizontal trajectory. This design was used in both the British No.44 "Pistol" and the German Rheinmetall-Borsig BAZ 55A fuzes.