On Mongolian Autonomy
According to The Reminiscence of Dr. Chao Tze-chi (趙自齊先生訪談錄), published by the Academia Historica in 2000, Chao articulated strong positions on Mongolian autonomy and played an active role in legislative debates on frontier governance during the early 1950s. He provided a detailed account of the controversy within the Legislative Yuan concerning the legal status of Mongolian self-government, outlining both the institutional process and his own intervention in policy discussions.
Chao recalled that on 16 March 1951, during the thirteenth session of the Legislative Yuan, a Statutory Revision Committee was established to compile a catalogue of existing laws. Debate over Mongolian autonomy soon generated heightened tensions between Mongol and Han representatives. The committee determined that laws should be repealed or amended under nine specified conditions, and after more than fifty committee meetings, nine plenary sessions, and six administrative reports to the Legislative Yuan, a consultative conference was convened on 26 March 1953 with representatives from the Presidential Office and the five branches of government. Chao argued that by April–May 1954 the five statutes formulated for frontier affairs were already sufficiently sound.
However, on 20 November of that year, the newly appointed chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, Liu Lien-ke, unexpectedly proposed incorporating several guiding principles—regarded by Liu as the supreme basis of Mongolian autonomy—directly into statutory law. Chao interpreted this initiative as inflaming ethnic antagonism and questioned the abrupt policy reversal:
Were the regulations that Chairman Tien Chung-chin had earlier argued should not be included truly omitted because of oversight—because Chairman Tien had been negligent beforehand and the Legislative Yuan inattentive afterward—such that his successor, Chairman Liu, now deemed them indispensable? The facts were by no means so. Acting out of prudence, Chairman Tien had already conducted extensive consultations with the majority of legislators and approached the matter with the utmost conscientiousness; he was certainly not guided by prejudice.
Chao contended that the so-called “Eight Principles of Mongolian Autonomy,” advocated by Liu, included provisions such as establishing a Mongolian Local Self-Government Political Council directly subordinate to the Executive Yuan and headed by Mongols, maintaining the existing banner-and-league administrative structure, and preserving existing jurisdictional authority. He argued that these proposals ultimately derived from Japanese wartime strategy: after failing to incorporate Mongolia into Manchukuo, Japanese agents—particularly Kenji Doihara—had courted Mongol aristocrats and encouraged what he described as “Greater Mongolian chauvinism,” producing what he characterized as a fictitious puppet autonomy associated with figures such as Demchugdongrub and Li Shouxin. On this basis, Chao labeled Liu's proposal a “bill of national humiliation.”
Chao further asserted that the “reality of Mongolian autonomy” consisted of attempts to institutionalize the alleged “national humiliation bill,” preserve the banner system, and restrict Han settlement, which he interpreted as unilateral efforts to secure legislative advantages. Drawing upon his upbringing in a village with a Mongol majority, he argued that frontier provinces had historically experienced long-standing interethnic coexistence:
For centuries the various ethnic groups have lived intermixed; the Han and minority peoples have consistently coexisted in peace and intimacy. Yet after the Mukden Incident, Japan conspired to divide our peoples and destroy our nation, inciting Demchugdongrub in order to rally disorderly sentiment. Coupled with the central government’s lack of clarity, its readiness to heed rumors, and its inclination toward expedient compromise, this created the pretext for Mongolian autonomy. The treachery of Demchugdongrub was later leveraged upon the foundations laid at Bailingmiao, and after victory the Chinese Communists exploited the situation to provoke ethnic discord, enabling a small number of ambitious elements among our Mongol compatriots to pressure the central authorities amid internal and external crises for their private ends.
He also criticized Mongolian autonomists for allegedly falsifying demographic data in an attempt to overturn what he regarded as the historically shared character of Mongolian lands between Han and Mongol populations, as well as, what he perceived as preferential treatment toward frontier minorities, citing the distribution of relief supplies under Minister of Social Affairs Ku Cheng-kang, which he believed unintentionally fostered division.
In a memorandum submitted to the central government, Chao set forth his own position on the banner-and-league system:
In a democratic state practicing the Three Principles of the People, the populace should enjoy the four fundamental freedoms—residence, belief, speech, and publication—as well as the basic rights of national independence, political democracy, and economic equality. All ethnic groups within the country ought to trust one another, render mutual assistance, and work in concert to achieve unity. China’s existing frontiers must maintain territorial integrity without condition. A modern state can accommodate multiple ethnicities; so long as they have dwelt for generations upon the nation’s soil, all are citizens of the Republic of China, and the government must naturally extend protection and fair treatment. Accordingly, every ethnic group owes loyalty to the state. Should any minority seek to secede and demand independence, such an act must be treated as treason and cannot be tolerated; those who encourage it should be regarded as acting in the least friendly manner and immediately restrained. We must make unmistakably clear what constitutes the government’s ultimate limits—once these are exceeded, the severest sanctions are required. Only through sincerity toward one another can coexistence and shared prosperity be achieved; only unity can prevent China from being invaded, and only thus can all enjoy the guarantees of security.
He further proposed a set of governing principles for Mongolia that were ultimately accepted by the central authorities after rejecting a competing platform advanced by Mongolian Politician, Wu Heling. :
All personnel dispatched by the central government to the frontier regions must possess an understanding of those regions and serve with a missionary spirit. In their daily lives, they must integrate closely with the frontier populations, so that unity is founded upon psychological identification.
Complete equality among all ethnic groups must be achieved. In legal, economic, and social terms, no discrimination in rights shall be permitted; however, obligations must likewise not be evaded.
Languages, cultures, and religious beliefs, provided that they do not undermine national unity, should be coordinated in order to pursue equality among ethnic groups.
Mongolian intellectuals and youth should be appointed and employed according to their abilities.
The appointment and examination of administrative officials must not be divided along ethnic lines and must be conducted with absolute fairness.
Frontier regions should develop transportation with railways as the primary mode, supplemented by air transport and highways. At a minimum, frontier railways should include at least three routes: one from Baotou to Lanzhou connecting with the Longhai Railway; one from Zhangjiakou through Duolun to Hulunbuir; and an extension of the Yunnan–Burma Railway into Burma to reach an Indian Ocean outlet.
Frontier welfare programs should aim to raise the living standards of Mongolian compatriots. Domestic resources and active assistance from the United Nations should be fully utilized to improve livestock breeds, reduce epizootic diseases, and establish wool textile and leather factories, enabling exchange with other regions for productive goods. Modern medicine should be introduced to prevent illness and death. Education should not be confined to traditional forms, but should emphasize mobility, so that men and women of all ages have opportunities to understand national and international conditions.
After the recovery of the mainland, governance must not rely solely on subjective judgments. Frontier inspection and research delegations must be organized and dispatched in groups to various regions for investigation, in order to avoid disputes arising from imagination or from reliance on the one-sided views of a small number of individuals. — Chao Tze-chi, 1955
Chao recalled that his role and policy stance prompted a protest on 26 October, when a total of sixty-five Mongolian political figures gathered at the Guangfu Hall of Zhongshan Hall to denounce him as the principal instigator and petition the central government for disciplinary action. Although Chiang Kai-shek expressed support for Chao, many of his Mongolian friends subsequently severed relations with him. Chao wrote:
“With regard to the sacred principles of the Constitution, I could not but abide by them. While my position may have failed to satisfy the designs of a minority, it was by no means grounded in prejudice. A self-drafted bill, by its very nature, did not meet the criteria for statutory incorporation; its exclusion was therefore entirely proper. That some legislators used this matter as a pretext for nonparticipation was plainly inappropriate, and the demand that the ‘culprit’ be punished was an especially regrettable exaggeration.”
